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The American economy has lurched from crisis to crisis for over a
decade, enduring long stretches of high unemployment, market
dysfunction, and ineffective government policy. Despite the
enormous scale of this suffering and disruption, the full implications
of the experience have not been absorbed by the corporate
governance literature. Corporate law’s focus on delivering financial
returns to shareholders works reasonably well in a robust economy,
when markets function effectively and align shareholder incentives
with the goal of maximizing social wealth. But these tidy mechanisms
fail in periods of macroeconomic stress, when markets send faulty
signals and firms pursuing short-term shareholder profits can destroy
social wealth. The layoffs or price increases often desired by
shareholders can be useful in a healthy economic environment, as
they cause resources to be allocated more efficiently to higher-value
uses, and competitive markets prevent harm from falling on workers
or consumers. But the same maneuvers can be destructive when the
economy is afflicted by unemployment or inflation. Revising
corporate governance arrangements so that companies focus less on
maximizing short term shareholder profits during crises can thus be
a useful tool for managing economic problems and improving
outcomes.
This Article begins the theoretical and practical work of adapting
corporate governance to periods of economic crisis.
After
demonstrating that the assumptions that have driven corporate law
debates depend on macroeconomic context, the Article shows that
correcting those assumptions could make corporate governance a
powerful tool for managing crises. These insights offer a useful
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framework for evaluating measures undertaken by businesses,
investors, and the government in response to the COVID-19 crisis,
while suggesting new avenues for action.
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Introduction
As the economy lurched from the global financial crisis, to the
period of prolonged stagnation and elevated unemployment that followed,
to the suspension of economic activity in the COVID-19 crisis, and now to
a period of dislocation and elevated inflation, the limits of traditional
macroeconomic tools were revealed. Governments looked to existing fiscal
and monetary policy tools for solutions to each challenge, but found that
those tools were often unavailable or ineffective. A new wave of legal
scholarship has sought to expand the toolkit by identifying ways that legal
rules could be altered to induce businesses and individuals to increase
investment and spending in times of economic trouble. 1 But relatively little
See, e.g., YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL
REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS (2019); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Should
Regulation Be Countercyclical?, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 857 (2017); Yair Listokin,
1
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has been done to use insights from the study of corporate governance to
mobilize the capacity of corporations to move the economy out of a crisis. 2
This Article seeks to explore this gap. The conceptual and practical
tools the Article develops could have a substantial impact. Corporations
command extraordinary financial resources and have enormous operational
scope. And because corporations can act flexibly and with dispatch, they
can readily respond to changing circumstances from high unemployment to
high inflation. Harnessing corporate capacity would dramatically improve
the economy’s ability to recover from a variety of serious economic crises.
Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions, 34 YALE J. ON
REG. 791 (2017); Zachary Liscow, Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An
Efficiency Argument for Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules , 116 COLUM.

L. REV. 1461 (2016).
2
This Article writes on a relatively clean slate, as academic study of the use
of corporate governance to counter recessions is at an early stage. Some works
have alluded to aspects of the story. See, e.g., Tianna Larson, Note, Countercyclical
Antitakeover Law: Dead Hand Poison Puts in a Zero Lower Bound Recession , 21
WAKE FOREST J. OF BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 319 (2021) (suggesting that the law
should be more tolerant of dead hand poison puts during recessions); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Addressing Economic Insecurity: Why Social Insurance Is Better Than
Corporate Governance Reform, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/08/21/addressing-economic-insecuritywhy-social-insurance-is-better-than-corporate-governance-reform/
(blog
post
suggesting that “many politicians . . . are really looking for companies to provide a
kind of Keynesian stimulus – that is, a way to drive the economy by spending not
government funds, but more shareholder capital, to promote a boom,” before
quickly rejecting the concept”); Zohar Goshen & Doron Levit, Common
Ownership and the Decline of the American Worker (manuscript) (suggesting that
common owners have forced managers to be too responsive to shareholders,
reducing investment and hiring). This Article provides a broader theoretical
framework that allows for evaluation of these mechanisms and intuitions.
Prior work has also narrowly considered how corporate governance at large
financial institutions ought to be revised to address financial crises. See Yair
Listokin & Inho Andrew Mun, Rethinking Corporate Law During a Financial
Crisis, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 349 (2018) (suggesting modifications to fiduciary
duties and voting rights at systemically important firms targeted for acquisition in
transactions arranged to avoid a financial crisis); John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. OF LEGAL ANAL. 35 (2014)
(suggesting weakening business judgment rule protection for managers of
systemically important firms, to align their incentives with those of diversified
shareholders). This Article analyzes a broader range of corporations, and considers
how changes to corporate law rules might improve macroeconomic performance
during recessionary periods.
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Corporate governance is a natural starting point in the effort to
harness the power of business. Traditional macroeconomic policy tools
seek to encourage businesses to decide to invest and hire in recessions by
changing the external environment in which they operate.3 But altering
corporate governance arrangements — the incentives and mechanisms that
drive corporate decisions — can operate more directly on corporate
investment and hiring decisions.
Corporate governance tools can also help address market
dysfunction. Recessions and other macroeconomic crises are market failures
in which wealth-generating transactions fail to occur.4 During a recession
characterized by a lack of aggregated demand, there are unemployed workers
who would be happy to buy more goods if only they could get a job, and there
are struggling businesses that would be happy to hire if only they could sell
more of their products. Markets are slow to reach an efficient equilibrium in
which these wealth-generating transactions occur. Both governments and
firms can help coordinate this type of beneficial activity without waiting for
the market to equilibrate. Where direct government action is not
forthcoming or is not effective, firms can step in to fill the gap.
Beyond practical implications, the analysis can shed new light on
longstanding theoretical debates in corporate governance. Macroeconomic
crises break the intuitions that have shaped corporate governance. The
traditional view of corporate governance is that directors and officers should
focus exclusively on the interests of shareholders.5 While corporations make
decisions that affect many other constituencies, including workers, creditors,
and local communities, those other constituencies are thought to be
protected by contracts and regulations.6 Because shareholders are paid only
after these legal obligations to other constituencies are satisfied, shareholders
are thought to feel the effects of marginal changes in the firm’s value most

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A; Morgan Ricks, Money, Private Law, and
Macroeconomic Disasters, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 73 (2020) (describing
3
4

recession caused by lack of aggregate demand “as a kind of economy-wide
coordination failure”).
5
See infra Part I.
6
E.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. Corp. L. 637, 656-57, 666 (2006); Jonathan R. Macey,

An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23
(1991).
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directly. They are thus believed to have the right incentives to create wealth
by maximizing output and minimizing costs like wages.
When the economy is succeeding, this outlook has a rough alignment
with the goal of maximizing social wealth. Labor is a scarce social resource,
and when a firm uses a worker’s time, that time is not available for other
valuable activities. When labor markets are functioning properly, the social
opportunity cost of deploying that worker time at the firm instead of
elsewhere is reflected in market wages. If an employee commands wages of
$20 an hour at a firm when labor markets are robust, it likely reflects the
employee’s ability to find another job paying roughly $20 an hour, which in
turn indicates that the employee could create more than $20 of value at that
other job. If the firm found a way to maintain existing production without
using the worker’s time, the worker would go to that other job and create that
value — the $20 an hour saved by the firm would reflect a genuine efficiency
gain that permits society to redeploy productive resources and create
additional wealth.7 As a result, in ordinary times, the goal of maximizing
shareholder profits has a rough correlation with the goal of maximizing social
wealth creation.
But in a recession with dysfunctional labor markets and persistent
high unemployment, wages may not correspond to the opportunity cost of
labor: if an employee is laid off, they may not be able to find another job or
create any value. The employee’s customary wages would still represent a
cost from the shareholder profits perspective, but would not reflect a genuine
opportunity cost from the social wealth perspective. Maximizing shareholder
profits by laying off workers could also have destructive effects. A layoff
would mean a period of extended unemployment for the worker, meaning
that the worker goes from creating some social wealth to none. Other costs
of a layoff include loss of income to the worker, a potential loss of productive
capacity for the economy if the worker is unemployed for an extended period
This is not to slight the real pain and disruption that would be experienced
by the worker. Even in a robust economy, a layoff that improves efficiency can be
personally devastating for the affected workers and their dependents — harms that
should be mitigated by policy. See Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl,
Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 587 n.214
(2018) (“Empirical evidence verifies that workers who are laid off suffer significant
harms and have trouble finding equally good jobs.”); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A.
Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 98 VA. L. REV.
579, 613-18 (2012) (documenting harms from layoffs, including increased mortality
rates). But in a robust economy and competitive labor market, the harms are
reduced because the affected workers are more likely to be able to find alternative
employment on comparable terms. Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra at 587.
7
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and loses skills, and a loss of demand as the worker curtails spending. These
costs are not borne by the firm’s shareholders directly, 8 and they are not likely
to be part of the calculus of directors and officers who are focused on a
narrow conception of shareholders’ interests. It would thus be helpful to
reform corporate governance to encourage managers to maintain spending
and investment, even if some shareholders feel slighted.
Reforming corporate governance in response to these issues could
yield substantial benefits because American corporations control substantial
resources. Apple, Inc. alone reported having almost $200 billion of cash,
cash equivalents, and marketable securities as of March 28, 2020, 9 about 10%
of the amount that the entire federal government devoted to its
unprecedented March 27, 2020 package to address the harms caused by
COVID-19.10 If corporations could be induced to use their resources to
expand investment and employment in times of economic trouble, they
could have an impact comparable to a major government program. And
because of their unique capabilities, their relationships with employees and
other stakeholders, and their capacity to act rapidly, their financial firepower
may actually understate their usefulness. Whether as a complement to
government efforts or as a substitute in the wake of an inadequate
government response, countercyclical corporate governance is worth
exploring.
These points support a range of policy approaches, with the primary
goal of reorienting firms to serve constituencies other than shareholders
during a crisis. Although they were not conceptualized as efforts to revise
corporate governance, various features of the policy response to COVID-19
suggested a growing recognition that corporations were vehicles to serve
constituencies like employees and customers, and not simply to generate
financial returns for shareholders.11 Shareholders like index funds can
deepen this trend with thoughtful interventions at portfolio companies,
mitigating recessions in a way that improves their long term returns and

8

E.g., LISTOKIN, supra note 1 at 93 (describing multiplier effect through

spending as a “classic externality”).
9
Apple,
Inc.,
Quarterly
Report
(May
1,
2020),
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000320193/ba1cb814-58aa-4cfc889b-16c800b712c2.pdf at 3. Apple is not unique. See Appendix A.
10
See Congressional Budget Office, H.R. 748, CARES Act, Public Law 116136 Cost Estimate (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56334
(program estimated to provide financial assistance of more than $2 trillion at cost
of $1.7 trillion).
11
See infra Part III.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4043883

7

FORTHCOMING N.C. L. REV.

8

improves their marketing position.12 The government can further support
countercyclical corporate governance through appropriate regulations. 13 The
discussion of policy approaches here is not intended to be exhaustive, but
should open an important conversation on ways that corporate governance
could support an economic recovery.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates the analysis by
describing the broader corporate governance debate between advocates of
shareholder primacy and stakeholder governance, before showing how the
arguments are shaped by macroeconomic context. Part II discusses the use
of macroeconomic policy to mitigate the business cycle, and shows how
existing tools are influenced by and could be supplemented by corporate
governance. Part III describes certain responses to the recession prompted
by COVID-19, and suggests that they signal an emerging appetite for
countercyclical corporate governance.
Part IV discusses how a
countercyclical corporate governance scheme could be implemented
through private measures such as index fund engagement. Part V briefly
describes government reforms that could further support countercyclical
corporate governance. Part VI considers limits and objections.
I.

Shareholder Primacy and Macroeconomic Context

This Part situates the analysis in the ongoing debate over the proper
orientation of corporate governance. Part I.A begins by describing the debate
between the shareholder primacy and stakeholder governance schools. Part
I.B shows how the debate is affected by macroeconomic context, examining
how the normal relationship between shareholder value maximization and
social wealth maximization breaks down in recessionary periods.
A.

Shareholder Primacy and Stakeholder Governance

The shareholder primacy or shareholder wealth maximization norm
posits that a corporation should be managed only to generate profits for its
shareholders.14 Under this paradigm, employees, creditors, and other groups
12
13
14

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A

business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.”); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP.
L. 277, 278 (1998) (“Employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and others may
possess contractual claims against a corporation, but shareholders claim the
corporation’s heart. This shareholder-centric focus of corporate law is often
referred to as shareholder primacy.”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The
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that are affected by a corporation’s decisions must either bargain for specific
contractual protections or obtain relief through governmental regulations.
Absent some specific formal limitation, corporate directors and officers are
to focus solely on shareholder welfare. This norm is supported by the
majority of academics, and is the conventional account of the law of
Delaware, America’s most important corporate law jurisdiction. 15
The principal argument for shareholder primacy conceptualizes
shareholders as the “residual claimants” on the corporation, and suggests that
they have the correct incentives to maximize economic value:
Bondholders have fixed claims, and
employees generally negotiate compensation
schedules in advance of performance. The
gains and losses from abnormally good or bad
performance are the lot of the shareholders,
whose claims stand last in line. . . . The firm
should invest in new products, plants, etc.,
until the gains and costs are identical at the
margin. . . . The shareholders receive most of
the marginal gains and incur most of the
marginal costs. They therefore have the right
incentives to exercise discretion.16
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001) (describing a
“standard shareholder-oriented model” under which “ultimate control over the
corporation should rest with the shareholder class; the managers of the corporation
should be charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of
its shareholders; [and] other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees,
suppliers, and customers, should have their interests protected by contractual and
regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate governance . . .”).
15
See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-

Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015)

(“within the limits of their discretion, directors [of Delaware corporations] must
make stockholder welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be taken into
consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder welfare”); Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 14 at 440 (describing “growing consensus on these issues”).
16
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J. OF L. & ECON. 395, 403 (1983); see also Eugene F. Fama, Market Forces Already
Address ESG Issues and the Issues Raised by Stakeholder Capitalism, HARV. L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Oct.
9,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/09/market-forces-already-address-esgissues-and-the-issues-raised-by-stakeholder-capitalism/ (The common solution to
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The conventional criticism of this argument attacks the claim that
shareholders are the residual claimants on the firm. When a firm is doing
well, it is likely to reward many constituencies, including employees; when it
is doing poorly, it is likely to squeeze or even remove them. 17 Given that
other constituencies also bear risk, it is not clear that shareholders have the
right incentives to maximize the value generated by the firm’s activities.
The shareholder primacy approach faces increasing competition
from stakeholder governance, which suggests that corporations should
consider and advance the interests of a broad range of constituencies,
including workers, creditors, suppliers, customers, and surrounding
communities. 18 Influential organizations like the Business Roundtable 19 and
the World Economic Forum20 have committed to stakeholder governance.

the problem of contract costs “is a contract structure in which almost all
stakeholders negotiate fixed payoffs . . . and shareholders bear the residual risk of
net cashflows—revenues minus costs. . . . In exchange for fixed payoff contracts for
other stakeholders, shareholders get most of the rights with respect to decisions that
affect net cashflows.”); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 39
(2012) (“The belief that shareholders are the residual claimants in corporations
leads naturally to the belief that maximizing shareholder wealth will maximize
overall social wealth as well. After all, if the interests of other stakeholders in the
corporation are fixed and predetermined, the only way to increase the value of the
shareholders’ residual interest is to increase the value of the corporation itself.”);
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 2 (1993);
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 36 (1991).
17
See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 16 at 41; Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (2002).
18
E.g., The Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the

Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’

(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtableredefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-allamericans.
19
Id.
20
E.g., World Economic Forum, Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal
Purpose of a Company in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universalpurpose-of-a-company-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/ (“The purpose of a
company is to engage all its stakeholders in shared and sustained value creation. In
creating such value, a company serves not only its shareholders, but all its
stakeholders – employees, customers, suppliers, local communities and society at
large.”).
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Stakeholder governance has faced serious criticism. First, critics have
argued that the stakeholder governance model is indeterminate, and fails to
provide a clear criterion for corporate decision-makers. 21 Because it fails to
provide a criterion for corporate decision-makers to apply, it also fails to offer
a criterion for others to use in holding decision-makers accountable. Second,
critics have argued that American corporate law only empowers
shareholders.22 Because only shareholders are able to vote for corporate
directors, who in turn select officers, corporate actors lack adequate
incentives to consider the interests of other stakeholders.
B.

The Relevance of Macroeconomic Context

Macroeconomic context adds an important dimension to these
issues. When the economy is producing at capacity and markets are
functioning properly, the interests of shareholders correlate with the broader
goal of maximizing social wealth. This relationship is broken during
recessionary periods when productive resources are idle and markets fail to
equilibrate.
Consider a simple firm that pays workers to produce a product, which
the firm sells on the market. After workers have been paid their wages, the
remaining profits are distributed to shareholders. In a tight labor market with
all workers in the economy employed, the shareholders have appropriate
incentives to bring the firm’s operations toward the social optimum. With
all workers fully employed, social wealth could only be increased by moving
workers from low value activities to high value activities. This suggests a
simple social criterion: a worker should be employed at the firm if and only
if the worker would generate more value at the firm than they would generate
if employed elsewhere. By contrast, shareholders have their own criterion:

See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of
Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2020); Stephen Bainbridge,
The Importance of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Standard,
21

ProfessorBainbridge.com
(Feb.
7,
2006),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2006/02/theimportance-of-the-shareholder-wealth-maximization-standard.html
(describing
“Bainbridge hypothetical” in which company faces decision on whether to shutter
a plant, and insisting that only shareholder wealth maximization standard provides
clear basis for decision).
22
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 21; Strine, Dangers of Denial, supra
note 15 at 766 (“In the corporate republic, no constituency other than stockholders
is given any power”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4043883

12

FORTHCOMING N.C. L. REV.

a worker should be employed at the firm if and only if the worker would
generate more value at the firm than their market wage.
With properly functioning labor markets, the social criterion aligns
with the shareholder criterion because market wages would correspond to
the value that a worker would generate at other firms. If the worker is not
generating more value than their market wage, the worker should leave the
firm and take on higher value work. While the worker might experience
painful disruptions in shifting from one job to another, the pain would be
mitigated by the speed with which the worker would get their next job.
Focusing on shareholder profits would thus lead a corporation to the correct
decision. 23
High unemployment and dysfunctional labor markets would break
the relationship between the social criterion and shareholders’ criterion by
damaging the ability of wages to send appropriate signals. Upon being fired,
a worker would not necessarily shift into a higher value activity. Instead, the
worker might face a prolonged period of unemployment, generating no value
at all. Societal wealth would decrease as production decreased, the worker
pared back spending, and the worker’s community was immiserated. Yet
shareholders would have an incentive to undertake layoffs until wages found
a new equilibrium.
To illustrate, suppose that Alpha Corporation pays an employee $20
per hour, and is happy to continue doing so because the employee generates
$21 in value per hour. The eccentric CEO of Beta Corporation then
poaches the employee by offering her more than $20 per hour in wages, and
assigns her to a make-work job that generates just $5 per hour. The decision
would cost Beta’s shareholders — the employee’s wages are reducing profits
by more than $15 an hour. And the decision would cost society — the
employee was generating $21 of wealth per hour at her job at Alpha, and is
now generating $5 of wealth. Suppose instead that Beta’s CEO filled the
make-work job by recruiting an unemployed person who previously had no
prospect of finding productive work. Beta’s shareholders would still protest,
because the employee’s wages are reducing profits by more than $15 an hour.
But the effect on social wealth would be positive — the employee was
generating $0 of wealth when unemployed, and is now generating $5 at Beta.
A hot economy resembles the former scenario. In the aggregate,
hiring would mean pulling a person away from some other valuable job, so
social wealth is maximized when businesses adopt the shareholders’ focus on
23

For a more formal statement of this point, see equation (3) in Appendix B.
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efficiency. But a slowing economy resembles the latter scenario. In the
aggregate, hiring would decrease unemployment, so social wealth can
increase when businesses undertake activities that do not directly increase
shareholder wealth.
When the economy is producing at capacity and labor markets are
functioning properly, it is also reasonable to contend that the shareholders
are the residual claimants on the firm. In a tight labor market, workers would
have a robust exit option if the firm sought to reduce their wages. As a result,
shareholders could not offload risk onto workers, and would have to bear the
firm’s risks. Under harsh macroeconomic conditions, this logic collapses.
Shareholders would be free to offload some of the firm’s risks onto the
workers, because workers would be afraid of termination.24
Importantly, this analysis does not depend on contestable claims that
shareholder primacy has contributed to social and macroeconomic ills like
income inequality, underinvestment in research and stagnant innovation, and
environmental degradation.25 It simply suggests that the ordinary logic of
corporate governance debates breaks down in macroeconomic crises.
These observations could be cast in the familiar language of
externalities. Firing a worker when the economy is performing well has
limited externalities, because the worker would quickly get a new job. Firing
a worker when the economy is performing poorly would have extensive
externalities, as the worker faces prolonged unemployment and cuts back on

See Stout, supra note 17 at 1194.
E.g., Karen Ho, In the Name of Shareholder Value: Origin Myths of
Corporations and their Ongoing Implications, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 609, 610
(2020); see also Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk,
24
25

73 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (2020) (attention to stakeholder issues would reduce
sensitivity to crises). These assertions are hotly contested. See, e.g., Matteo Gatti
& Chrystin Ondersma, Can a Broader Corporate Purpose Redress Inequality?
The Stakeholder Approach Chimera, 46 J. CORP. L. 101 (2020).
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spending at other businesses.26 Increased externalities during periods of crisis
complicate the ordinary logic of corporate governance.27
Of course, a diversified shareholder will absorb some of the
consequences of an economy-wide slowdown, and as a result would capture
some of the benefits from actions that ameliorate a recession. A shareholder
can also have preferences and economic interests outside of their holdings at
a given firm; a worker who owns stock may derive greater benefits from a
robust labor market than from marginally better stock returns. To the extent
these forces lead shareholders in the right direction, countercyclical
corporate governance may only require firms to listen to the right
shareholders, as opposed to listening to stakeholders. 28
The discussion suggests other implications for corporate governance
debates. Critics of stakeholder governance complain that it fails to offer a
criterion for action. This complaint has some force in periods of robust
macroeconomic performance.
Under those conditions, stakeholder
governance must rely on economically indeterminate ideas about fairness or
corporate purpose to guide decisions. But in recessionary periods, social
wealth maximization becomes a valid criterion to guide corporate action.
Indeed, in such periods corporate governance can become a useful tool for
policymakers seeking to maximize social wealth.
II.

Macroeconomic Policy

This Part begins the work of considering corporate governance as a
tool of macroeconomic policy. Part II.A briefly discusses recessions and
their costs. It then describes traditional policy responses to recessions and
LISTOKIN, supra note 1 at 93 (“When multipliers exceed one, spending
causes a positive externality. . . . When the buyer spends, she raises the seller’s
income. In turn, the seller spends, benefiting people who had no connection to
the first transaction. Such ‘downstream’ third-party effects are a classic externality,
and the literature demonstrating high multipliers at the zero lower bound testifies
to the importance of this externality.”); Liscow, supra note 1 at 1481 (describing
multiplier effect as a “positive externality” that exists only “when unemployment is
high”).
27
Alternatively, a firm’s decision to consume workers’ scarce time normally
has an externality: workers’ time is not available to other firms for other productive
activities. In that environment, wages serve as a kind of Pigouvian tax; because
shareholders must pay wages, they do not consume workers’ time beyond optimal
levels. But when unemployment is elevated for an extended period, the externality
has declined and the Pigouvian tax has not dropped in response.
28
See infra Part IV.A.
26
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the non-traditional policy lever of changing ordinary legal rules and
regulations. These tools either substitute for a decline in demand by private
actors, or encourage private actors to spend or invest. Part II.B shows that
corporate governance arrangements affect the way that firms respond to
macroeconomic policy interventions, and thus affect interventions’ impact.
As a result, policymakers seeking to prevent or mitigate macroeconomic
crises must be attentive to corporate governance. Part II.C considers whether
changes to corporate governance might provide a non-traditional economic
stimulus. During a recession, prioritizing stakeholder interests could be a
useful tool to boost economic activity.
A.

Policy Responses to Recessions

In the long run, the economy should naturally move to an
equilibrium that reflects its real capacity. If workers are unemployed and the
economy is producing below its capacity, real wages and prices should
gradually decline. The decline in real prices effectively increases the money
supply and lowers interest rates, causing businesses to borrow, invest and
hire. The resulting increase in business activity brings the economy back to
its equilibrium.
But as Keynes wrote, in the long run, we are all dead. Wages can be
“sticky,” meaning that they do not adjust immediately to changes in the
marketplace. As a result, labor markets may fail to clear for long periods of
time, with wages remaining too high to properly match the demand and
supply for labor, leaving large numbers of willing workers remaining
unemployed. Delays in reaching full employment are painful for individuals
who are unable to find work. A long delay can also damage the productive
capacity of the economy in the long run as workers lose skills and valuable
relationships dissolve.29 And long recessions can damage the legitimacy of
governmental institutions, prompting adoption of dangerous political
philosophies.30

See LISTOKIN, supra note 1 at 70-72 (describing “hysteresis” phenomenon
in which periods of unemployment reduce the long term potential of the economy);
Masur & Posner, Unemployment, supra note 7 at 583 (“A senior worker who is
laid off will on average experience a long-term reduction in income of as much as
twenty percent, probably because the worker loses significant firm- and industryspecific human capital as a result of the layoff.”).
30
See LISTOKIN, supra note 1 at 73 (noting that “deep recessions and
financial crises have a history of boosting the populist right in particular”); Steven
A. Ramirez, Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV.
29
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As the Great Depression unfolded and these threats materialized,
governments assumed responsibility for mitigating and shortening
recessions.31 To discharge that responsibility, policymakers sought new tools.
These tools include the three standard levers of fiscal policy, monetary
policy, and automatic stabilizers. Recent research has explored a fourth
avenue of regulatory changes. The different tools operate using different
mechanisms.

1.

Fiscal Policy

Fiscal policy entails government deficit spending. The government
responds to a decline in aggregate demand by increasing its own
expenditures, by reducing taxes so as to encourage expenditures by private
persons, or both. As demand increases, firms respond by hiring to increase
their production of goods and services. Newly-hired employees spend a large
portion of their income, further increasing demand and multiplying the effect
of the stimulus. This multiplier effect can be substantial. 32
But fiscal policy suffers from serious institutional impediments.
Fiscal policy generally requires congressional action: the House, Senate, and
President must agree on a bill to have the federal government spend more
money or to revise tax policy. The necessary consensus is often lacking in
Washington, and even when it is present, the process often moves slowly.

2.

Monetary Policy

Monetary policy offers a different tool for managing recessions. The
Federal Reserve is led by expert appointees who are insulated from political
pressures and processes.33 It can quickly take actions that influence the
money supply and the cost of borrowing. Chief amongst these are open
market operations, in which the Federal Reserve buys or sells financial
instruments. When the Federal Reserve spends money to buy financial
instruments, it increases the supply of money in the economy and makes it
easier for economic actors to raise funds by issuing financial instruments.

515, 525-26 (2003) (describing political instability in the United States during the
Great Depression).
31
Ramirez, supra note 30.
32
See Masur & Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, supra note
1 at 863.
33
Ramirez, supra note 30 at 540-41 (describing introduction of Federal
Reserve independence in response to Great Depression)
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This lowers real prices and makes it easier for firms to raise money to invest
in new projects that create jobs.
The institutional set up of the Federal Reserve solves the problems
of speed and consensus, as its expert leaders can agree quickly on a course
of action and move with dispatch. But these features also contribute to a
sense that its actions are undemocratic and illegitimate.34 It is also easier for
the Federal Reserve to directly assist large economic actors than to help
individuals or small businesses. Governments, financial institutions, and
large corporations can issue securities in the capital markets, which the
Federal Reserve can act on directly. To assist small businesses and
individuals, the Federal Reserve must generally act indirectly.
In recent years, monetary policy has also been constrained by nearzero interest rates. At this “zero lower bound,” it is difficult to reduce interest
rates further — a negative interest rate would mean charging people to lend
money, and at some point they would rather physically store money than loan
it out. As a result, it has been difficult to use monetary policy to encourage
firms to borrow more and invest in projects.

34

Casino,

See Matt Taibbi, How the COVID-19 Bailout Gave Wall Street a No-Lose

ROLLING
STONE
(May
13,
2020),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/taibbi-covid-19-bailout-wallstreet-997342/ (asserting that the Federal Reserve had been “shooting a bazooka of
cash daily at Wall Street,” as part of the “coronavirus bailout”); Anthony J. Casey
& Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
479, 495 (2015) (Federal Reserve action to reduce interest rates could be labeled a
suspicious “bailout”).
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3.

Automatic Stabilizers

Automatic stabilizers are policies that naturally deliver stimulus
during recessions. For example, programs that provide funds to unemployed
people or people with low incomes will naturally entail higher government
expenditures when the economy is ailing. Similarly, a progressive tax system
will naturally take a smaller percentage of income out of the economy when
incomes decrease. Such policies are often put in place outside of an
economic crisis, for fairness or humanitarian reasons largely separate from
their macroeconomic effect. Because they do not require additional
legislative action, there is no delay in their implementation.
The main problem with automatic stabilizers is that there are not
enough of them. Although they help reduce suffering and unfairness, they
are not sufficient to bring the economy out of a major crisis.

4.

Reforming Legal Rules

Like other policy interventions, government mandates can affect
price levels and induce businesses to spend and invest. Academics have been
increasingly attentive to these effects, suggesting that legal rules might be
altered during recessions to improve economic outcomes.35
Perhaps due to the relative infancy of academic study of this set of
tools, it seems to have been used in a blunderbuss fashion, if at all. During
the economic crisis prompted by COVID-19, the Trump Administration
ordered that agencies should respond to the “economic emergency by
rescinding, modifying, waiving, or providing exemptions from regulations
and other requirements that may inhibit economic recovery.”36 A subsequent
order purported to suspend environmental reviews of infrastructure
projects.37 The orders themselves did not appear to reflect a careful weighing
of the costs or benefits of relaxed rules.38

See supra note 1.
Exec. Order No. 13924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,353, 31,353 (May 22, 2020).
37
Exec. Order No. 13927, 85 Fed. Reg. 35165 (June 4, 2020).
38
Cf. Masur & Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, supra note 1
at 868-73 (laying out factors relevant to whether a regulatory suspension would
provide net benefits).
35
36
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Corporate Governance as a Complement to Traditional
Macroeconomic Policy Tools

Corporate governance can interact with traditional macroeconomic
policy interventions. As a result of these interactions, revisions to corporate
governance rules can help preserve the effectiveness of traditional
government tools.
Expanding purchases as part of a traditional fiscal policy will likely
entail contracting with existing private firms. It may be possible for the
government to expand purchases by directly employing workers and
coordinating their production of goods and services, as with the New Deal
Civilian Conservation Corps.39 But that approach would require the
government to build, or to rebuild, the capacity to flexibly scale activities up
and down.
Contracts with existing firms implicate corporate governance
principles because a firm that seeks to maximize shareholder wealth will
attempt to divert a contract’s value to its shareholders.40 While funds diverted
to shareholders will provide some stimulus, the effect is likely to be less than
that of funds flowing to newly-employed workers. Unlike a relatively wealthy
shareholder seeing a stock price appreciate, a newly-employed worker is
likely to spend her paycheck at other businesses, multiplying the effect of the
stimulus.41 As a result, when a firm bargains hard to maximize shareholder
profits on a government contract, it dampens the stimulus from the
government spending.42
Ramirez, supra note 30 at 556-57.
For example, during the global financial crisis, banks arguably used
additional government funds to bolster their balance sheets for the benefit of
shareholders, instead of expanding lending to stimulate the economy. See
MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS 16 (2015); Marcel Kahan
& Edward B. Rock, When the Government is the Controlling Shareholder, 89
TEXAS L. REV. 1293, 1303 (2011).
41
See Masur & Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, supra note
1 at 870.
42
It might be possible to address this issue with more complicated contractual
terms. But such terms may be time-consuming to negotiate, reducing their
effectiveness in responding quickly and forcefully to a recession. Any complexities
may also diminish the effect of the stimulus by reducing the business’s confidence
in profits and willingness to hire. And any restrictions may be leaky, or subverted
through the allocation of fungible funds. Cf. Dhammika Dharmapala, C. Fritz
Foley & Kristin J. Forbes, Watch What I Do, Not What I Say, 66 J. OF FIN. 753,
757 (2011) (finding that firms that repatriated funds at favorable tax rates during a
39
40
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Monetary policy also interacts with corporate governance. Monetary
interventions are thought to work by encouraging investment and spending.
By acting to lower the cost of borrowing, the Federal Reserve can cause firms
to undertake new projects that employ more workers. But the effectiveness
of the mechanism depends on firms translating lower borrowing rates into
new economic activity.
When firms borrow money from creditors simply to give money to
shareholders, they complicate this mechanism. Instead of increasing
economic activity and employment by encouraging firms to embark on
additional projects, the monetary tool simply sends funds to shareholders. 43
This may provide some stimulus, because shareholders may increase their
spending as a result. But the effect will be less than if firms translate lower
borrowing costs into new business activity. 44
Firms that transact in their own shares may have an incentive to go
further, and engage in “costly contractions.” 45 A firm should return capital to
shareholders if and only if the shareholders would be able to redeploy the
capital in opportunities outside the firm that would have a higher value than
activities within the firm. But if the stock price is depressed, firms may be
able to generate greater financial returns for their long term shareholders by
forgoing valuable projects and using the extra funds to cash out uncommitted
shareholders at the depressed price. This may be more of a threat if stock
markets are depressed and volatile.
Of course, shareholders may not appreciate this maneuver, even
though it would be designed to maximize the eventual share price. 46 The
tax holiday were able to direct additional money to shareholders despite regulations
intended to limit repatriated funds to domestic investment or employment).
43
See RANA FOROOHAR, MAKERS AND TAKERS 142-44 (2016) (urging that
“the barbarians stole our stimulus” because “companies didn’t take advantage of
low borrowing rates” created by Federal Reserve action “in order to invest in Main
Street; they did it to buy back stock and enrich corporate leaders and investors”).
44
See infra notes 54 to 56 and accompanying text.
45
Jesse F. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders,
124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1562, 1593-94 (2015).
46
Cf. Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood

Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance
System, 126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1891 n.64 (2017) (“And the market no longer gives

much credit to buy-backs and return of capital . . . I have never thought buy-backs
did anything, and the return of capital platform is a lot less credible now” (quoting
practitioner)). Indeed, maximizing return on equity — as opposed to total
shareholder value — might be understood as a species of agency problem. Cf.
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funds returned to them would have to be deployed elsewhere, at a time when
there are relatively few investment opportunities available. 47 Like an
employee fired during a recession, a shareholder may struggle to redeploy
their capital at a higher value activity if it is returned to them at a time when
other opportunities are lacking.48 By advancing a narrow conception of its
shareholders’ interests, the firm would thus fail to maximize the value of its
shareholders’ full portfolio. More fundamentally, financial engineering to
support share buybacks would sap the force of a monetary intervention.
This is more than theoretical. After the Federal Reserve’s massive
intervention to ensure that credit would continue to flow in the wake of the
COVID-19 crisis, companies borrowed extensively and used funds to
support stock buybacks.49 A macroeconomic intervention intended to permit
companies to undertake new projects that would boost employment was
instead partially used to pump up returns to shareholders.
Appropriate corporate governance rules can thus improve the
effectiveness of traditional fiscal and monetary stimulus. If firms are oriented
toward objectives other than shareholder value maximization, they are more
likely to direct the impact of fiscal and monetary interventions toward their
intended targets. Even if political institutions like Congress and the Federal
Testimony of Prof. Jesse M. Fried, Examining Corporate Priorities: The Impact of

Stock Buybacks on Workers, Communities, and Investment: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets of
the H. Comm on Financial Services, 116th Cong. (Oct. 17, 2019) (executives may

use stock buybacks to game performance measures in compensation agreements).
47
Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?, supra note 46 at 1939 (“For
the stuck-in human investor, increased dividends have to be invested back into the
very companies paying them out, and the same is basically true as to buybacks.”).
If index fund investors simply reinvest within the index, there will be no impact on
spending, and the monetary intervention would simply inflate the price of financial
assets.
48
In a challenging economic environment, other firms may lack the
company’s capacity to pursue a project, or might have difficulty accessing capital at
the low rate that makes it worthwhile. Cf. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire
Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32 (2011) (when a
firm is in distress and selling off productive assets, its competitors are likely to also
be in distress and unable to buy).
49
See, e.g., Apple Inc., Rule 424B2 Prospectus Supplement S-9 (May 4,
2020) (“We intend to use such net proceeds [from a notes sale] for general
corporate purposes, including repurchases of our common stock and payment of
dividends under our program to return capital to shareholders, funding for working
capital, capital expenditures, acquisitions and repayment of debt.”).
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Reserve are prepared to respond appropriately to a crisis, corporate
governance tools would be a useful complement to their efforts.
C.

Corporate Governance as an Independent Macroeconomic
Policy Tool

Apart from supporting macroeconomic policy, corporate governance
arrangements could also be used independently to deliver a macroeconomic
stimulus. In some sense, the point follows directly from the observations
above regarding the sensitivity of corporate governance debates to
macroeconomic context50 and the macroeconomic impacts of regulations.51
If employment-creating projects or precautions are more justified in a
recession, a system of corporate governance that encourages the same steps
is similarly justifiable. This section works through potential impacts of a
macroeconomic focus.

1.

Revising the Profit Maximization Goal

Traditional tools change corporate decisions by changing the external
environment in which corporations operate. Policymakers encourage firms
to hire more workers or make job-creating investments by allowing wages to
decline, stimulating demand for products, or lowering interest rates.
Policymakers might consider an alternative approach that changes corporate
decisions by changing their internal objectives.
Appendix B presents a simple model, but the intuition is
straightforward. Given a particular price and wage level, a profit maximizing
firm will continue to hire workers and increase production until the marginal
productivity of labor equals wages. That is, it will continue to hire until an
additional worker would bring in less money in revenue than the worker
would cost in wages.
If a policymaker wants the firm to hire more workers in a recession,
it can allow wages to decline.52 Lower wages would mean that additional
workers cost less, causing a profit maximizing firm to hire more than it would
at a higher wage level. But the policymaker could achieve the same level of
hiring by changing the firm’s internal objective so that it does not maximize
50
51

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.A.4.

Policymakers could also actively intervene to push wages down. E.g.
MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, THE SHARE ECONOMY (1984) (proposing alternative
compensation scheme in which workers are paid a fixed share of firm revenue,
causing an increase in hiring and a decrease in wages).
52
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profits. A firm that balances profits and worker wellbeing will hire more at a
given wage level than a firm that simply maximizes profits.
Reorienting the firm may be a better approach than allowing wage
declines. First, while both mechanisms would induce the firm to make the
desired hiring and production decision, they would not be identical in their
effects: allowing wages to decline reduces worker earnings, while reorienting
the firm away from shareholders reduces shareholder profits.
Because workers are more likely to spend an additional dollar of
wages than shareholders are to spend an additional dollar of wealth,
reorienting the firm toward workers will do more to stimulate consumption
and aggregate demand than lowering wages.
Shareholders are
disproportionately wealthy, and are less likely to need the additional money
to fund expenditures.53 Increased profits also may not translate into real net
cash flows to shareholders. If the firm simply retains the funds, shareholders
can only tap their portion of the funds by selling stock. But while the seller
receives cash in a transaction, the purchaser gives up cash, keeping the net
effect at zero.54 If the company uses the additional profits to repurchase
shares or pay dividends, the effect may still be muted. If index fund investors
simply keep the money in the fund — as they are likely to do, given that the
purpose of an index fund strategy is to simply hold passively for decades
instead of actively reallocating capital — they have nothing to gain from the
inflated prices.
Ordinary people like typical workers are also risk averse, and derive
the bulk of their wealth from their involvement with their employers. By
contrast, shareholders of large firms are generally diversified and indifferent
to idiosyncratic events at particular firms. As a result, protecting workers will
do more to help individuals’ wealth and well-being, and thus to prop up
demand, than protecting shareholders’ interests. 55

53

See Masur & Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, supra note

1 at 870 (if a regulatory stimulus resulted in funds going to shareholders as opposed
to new projects, the impact would “be limited or nil because shareholders are
typically wealthy and unlikely to spend much of their savings”).
54
That said, there may be a second order effect, in which a shareholder sees
that their wealth has increased and spends more of their available cash.
55
Cf. Casey & Posner, supra note 34 at 532 (suggesting that it makes “more
sense for the government to bail out ordinary people than large firms,” because
“ordinary people are risk-averse, while large firms are owned by diversified
shareholders”).
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Second, reorienting the firm can also be a particularly efficient way to
inject funds into the economy because the increase in total worker earnings
would be greater than the decrease in shareholder profits: the firm’s use of
additional labor results in increased production and sale of goods that
partially offsets the increase in total wages. The firm is not a zero sum
battleground between worker and shareholder interests.
In a robust economy, the seeming multiplier effect is not real. Any
labor that is not employed at the firm and earning a wage of $1 from the firm
would have been employed elsewhere, earning a wage of $1 there. Increasing
the total wages paid by the firm does not create real value for the economy,
but the reduction in shareholder profits represents a genuine destruction of
value.56 As a result, the shareholders’ perspective on the firm aligns with the
goal of maximizing societal wealth. But in a weak economy, workers that are
not employed by the firm may not be able to find work at a $1 wage. Some
portion of the increase in total wages represents a real increase in the value
generated by the firm.
Third, this type of stimulus can be delivered quickly. If the firm
already has a high labor level, it can deliver a stimulus immediately by simply
holding off on layoffs that would be pursued by a profit maximizing firm in
the more challenging economic environment. By contrast, fiscal policy can
require months of congressional deliberation, followed by months of effort
to prepare projects. And even if the Federal Reserve acts quickly to lower
interest rates, it can take months for the rate change to be translated into
improved investment activity.57

Under ideal conditions, wages equal the marginal productivity of labor.
The point is captured at the firm level by equation (3) in Appendix B, with s = 1.
The ideal conditions may not always apply. In some labor markets, employers may
enjoy market power and may be able to set wages below the marginal revenue
product of labor. See Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 7 at 537. However, there
is significant evidence that macroeconomic trends in wages have been driven more
by a decline in workers’ market power — that is, its ability to capture economic rents
by commanding wages above labor’s marginal revenue product. See Anna
Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis:
An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy, NBER
Working Paper No. 27193 (May 2020) (noting that monopsony explanation is
difficult to square with lack of inflation).
57
See Masur & Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, supra note
1 at 864-65 (“However, economists believe that most businesses make investment
decisions approximately six months in advance. Accordingly, the effects of a
56
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Transactional frictions can also make the internal approach faster
than an external approach. If “sticky wages” are preventing wages from
declining enough to clear the labor market, the firm may still be able to act
more quickly to achieve the proper production decision by reweighting its
objective function to focus more on workers. Mechanically, it may also be
easier for a firm to reorient its approach to major decisions (a strategy that
can be handled at the hub of the firm by the officers and directors) than to
renegotiate wages with each employee (a strategy that requires reworking
every spoke between the firm and each individual). 58 Governments
sometimes bail out companies instead of individual stakeholders because of
the administrative difficulty of reaching each individual. 59 The same
consideration supports reorienting firms instead of attempting to address
every individual’s relationship with the firm.

2.

Revising Decisions on Risky Investments

Altering firms’ approach to risk would also encourage investments
that have macroeconomic value. Suppose that a company has assets of $8,
debts of $6, and equity of $2. The firm has an opportunity to make an
investment of $5 at time t, with a 50% probability of delivering $8 at time t +
1 and a 50% probability of delivering $0 at time t + 1. Risk neutral
shareholders would prefer that the investment be made: with the investment
there is a 50% chance of equity being worth $5 at t + 1 and a 50% chance of
equity being worth $0, for an expected value of $2.50, which is greater than
$2 without the investment. Creditors would prefer that the investment not
be made: there is a 50% chance of there being $6 to settle the debts and a
50% chance of there being $3 to settle the debts, for an expected value of
$4.50, which is less than $6 without the investment.
In ordinary times, society would prefer that the corporation follow
the creditors’ lead. The project has a negative expected value: there is a 50%
chance of delivering a total of $3 (costing $5 of resources at t and delivering
$8 at t + 1) and a 50% chance of delivering a total of -$5, for an expected
value of -$1. Commentators have described the selection of a “risky project
change in monetary policy will typically be visible only after that much time has
passed.”).
58
There is some evidence that codetermination systems are more effective
in permitting this type of negotiation. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
59
See Casey & Posner, supra note 34 at 532 (“Unfortunately, bailouts of
ordinary people such as homeowners may be administratively infeasible. As the
number of bailout recipients increases, the government must spend more money
on administrative costs.”).
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that makes creditors worse off by more than it makes shareholders better off”
as a form of “misbehavior” referred to as “overinvestment.” 60
But in stressed macroeconomic conditions, the analysis could be
more complicated. The benefit of $5 of stimulus today may be worth the
overall cost. If the corporation follows the interests of equity holders, it would
effectively be investing as if real interest rates were -20% or lower — an
extreme trade-off to be sure, but potentially worthwhile temporarily if the
economy is being held back because interest rates are unable to reach a below
zero equilibrium.61

3.

Setting Corporate Priorities

These points suggest an opportunity to operationalize the connection
between corporate governance debates and macroeconomic context.62 If
policymakers can find ways to reset corporate priorities to encourage regard
for workers and openness to risk taking, they can create value for society
during a crisis. The magnitude of these benefits should not be understated.
The cost of being laid off to one worker alone could be as high as $250,000. 63
Knock on effects from the resulting decline in the worker’s spending are
substantial, with estimates of the multiplier effect ranging to 1.5. 64 Avoiding
layoffs and boosting hiring could have an enormous impact.
To operationalize the approach, it would be necessary to address the
concern that stakeholder governance does not offer a clear criterion for
weighing competing interests.65 But the analysis above shows that a criterion
based on macroeconomic context can suggest priorities for corporate actors.
For example, a corporate leader trying to decide between maintaining wages
for the current workforce and hiring previously-unemployed workers at lower
wages might apply macroeconomic reasoning and findings. Raising
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 874 (1996).
60

Of course, this would transfer value from creditors to equity holders. If
creditors have a higher marginal propensity to consume, disruptions to the credit
markets would be more damaging to the real economy than disruptions to the
equity markets, or the costs of a bankruptcy restructuring would be high, the
calculus would shift.
62
See supra Part I.B.
63
See Masur & Posner, Unemployment, supra note 7 at 618 (providing
estimates of earnings losses of $100,000 and nonpecuniary costs like increased
mortality of as much as $160,000).
64
LISTOKIN, supra note 1 at 234 n.27.
65
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
61
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someone’s income from zero is likely to do more to increase demand — the
previously unemployed person is likely to spend more of the new income —
suggesting that the latter course would be preferable.66
Naturally, there is likely to be debate about the best way for a
corporate actor to react to the macroeconomic context. But debates about
business strategy are common as well. Business executives disagree and
advocate for different strategies, even when their shared goal is to maximize
shareholder returns; their actions are then debated by academics and the
press. Indeed, if there were obvious right answers to business problems,
there would be little reason for a business judgment rule insulating decisions
from judicial review. A criterion based on a blinkered microeconomic
efficiency approach is not more determinative than one that accounts for the
broader context.
The discussion does raise the question of why policymakers should
employ countercyclical corporate governance instead of more traditional
means. First, the argument above shows that firms oriented solely to
shareholder wealth maximization will make decisions that are suboptimal for
society during a period of crisis. Even if the government uses traditional
means to speed the end of a crisis, countercyclical corporate governance
would correct corporate decision-making in the interim. Second, traditional
tools are often slow and unavailable during a period of crisis, 67 or inequitable
and distortionary.68 Corporate governance tools have the potential to permit
rapid action in a less distortionary form. Third, corporations may be able to
take advantage of economies of scope in delivering stimulus. 69 They have
substantial operations that place them in contact with workers, suppliers,
customers, shareholders, and creditors; they thus have the ability to modify
their operations to deliver benefits to those constituencies. Finally,
corporations may have access to information that is not available to the
government. For example, there is clearly some point at which shareholders
will refuse to accept reduced returns at a company to support the goal of
Cf. Masur & Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, supra note 1
at 866 (discussing empirical finding that programs that raise a person’s income from
zero, such as unemployment benefits or food stamps, do more to stimulate the
economy than programs that provide marginal disposable income, such as
reductions in income tax rates).
67
See supra Part II.A.1, 3.
68
See supra Part II.A.2.
69
See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and
the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 590-93 (2009) (discussing how
a company’s operations may give it unique access to opportunities to deliver
benefits).
66
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bringing the economy out of a crisis. In its capacity as regulator or contractual
counterparty to the corporation, the government may not be able to find that
breakpoint with the same precision, and thus may not be able to squeeze
shareholders to the same extent.
The discussion also raises the question of whether changes to
corporate law would be an effective tool. The analysis in this Article does
assume a basically Keynesian framework, in which policymakers manage a
decline in aggregate demand by acting to encourage spending and
investment.70 The basic framework does not seem controversial, in the sense
that a broad range of policymakers pursue it: Republicans seek to boost
savings and investment through tax cuts and Democrats seek to boost savings
and investment through direct expenditures and transfer payments to the
needy. All parties seem to recognize the value of boosting business
confidence during a recession,71 presumably because they recognize that
businesses could help the economy if they decided to increase their activity
level.
As noted above, large companies have enormous resources to draw
on in a recession, often in the form of cash.72 Apple alone had approximately
$200 billion of cash and equivalents at its disposal at the time of the federal
government’s $2 trillion stimulus package to address the economic crisis
caused by COVID-19. Apple also knows how to employ people. The
median salary for an Apple employee in 2019 was $57,596. By comparison,
the federal government’s Paycheck Protection Program adopted in the wake
Not all macroeconomic crises involve declines in aggregate demand that
can be remedied through a macroeconomic policy. Cf. Masur & Posner, Should
Regulation Be Countercyclical?, supra note 1 at 887 n.106 (carving out “exogenous
demand shocks that do not reflect negatively on the fundamentals of an industry”).
And Keynesian ideas are not universally shared among economists. Liscow, supra
note 1 at 1470 n.38.
71
See, e.g., Kevin Liptak, Pamela Brown & Sarah Westwood, Trump has
private concerns over the economy despite public displays of confidence, CNN
(Sep. 7, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/07/politics/economic-warning-signstrump-all-hands-on-deck/index.html (“. . . Trump and top aides . . . have phoned
business leaders to update them on the state of China trade talks and other
economic efforts in an attempt at reassurance.”); Jake Tapper, Cheerleader in Chief
Obama Projects Confidence, ABC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2009),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Economy/story?id=7079085&page=1
(“The
president and his economic team have upped the ante in their language when
discussing the economy, sensing that . . . the nation needs an investment of
optimism.”).
72
See Appendix A.
70
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of COVID-19 cost between $162,000 and $381,000 per job saved, with a
preferred estimate of $224,000.73 As an extremely crude estimate, if Apple
used all of its cash reserves to put people to work at the median salary for its
employees, Apple could theoretically keep over three million people
employed for a year. If the company put all of its net income into employing
new people at its median salary, Apple could theoretically employ 700,000
people. If those workers were being employed productively, generating
additional income, the numbers would be even greater. This is just one
company, and these are not small numbers.
Of course, firms might have the financial firepower to act in ways that
have macroeconomic effects, but may lack the operational capacity to
productively employ tens of thousands of additional people on short notice.
There may also be distributional concerns — if relatively wealthy tech firms
simply act in ways that benefit their relatively wealthy employees, the
approach would be unfair and the stimulus effect would be muted. 74 But
these concerns also apply to government action. The government might also
struggle to find useful work for hundreds of thousands of people, and its
chosen measures to respond to crises can have unfair distributional impacts
that limit their effectiveness.75
Large firms also have operational moves readily available. They can
simply hold off on layoffs, even where layoffs would create profits for
shareholders. They can also commission new construction or blue sky
investment projects, including by contracting with other firms. Another
Amazon headquarters project or Google fiber optics project would mobilize
blue collar workers.
This effect might be muted if shareholders reduced their spending in
response to the diversion of wealth from them to workers. But this is
unlikely. In 2020, Apple stock traded at a price to earnings ratio of over 30
to 1. In other words, only about 3% of the value of an Apple share came
from the income that Apple generated in 2020. In principle, if Apple
committed to devoting all of its earnings to workers for one year (and one
year only), Apple shareholders would see the value of their Apple shares
See Raj Chetty, et al., How Did COVID-19 and Stabilization Policies
Affect Spending and Employment? A New Real-Time Economic Tracker Based
on Private Sector Data (June 17, 2020), https://opportunityinsights.org/wp73

content/uploads/2020/05/tracker_paper.pdf
74
Cf. Liscow, supra note 1 at 1483 n.82 (“poorer workers have a higher
marginal propensity to consume, leading to greater macrostimulus benefits”).
75
See FOROOHAR, supra note 43 at 142-43 (urging that monetary response
to the Great Recession largely benefitted the wealthy and not the middle class).
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reduced by just 3%.76 It is hard to imagine that the size of this effect on the
shareholders’ spending could be comparable to the size of the effect on new
workers’ spending.
The point is amplified by multiplier effects. A firm that is willing to
accept a $1 reduction in shareholder profits can spend more than $1, because
some of the additional spending will be offset by additional revenues. 77 And
$1 of additional wages in the hands of a low income worker is likely to drive
more overall spending than an additional $1 of shareholder wealth. 78
Finally, even if countercyclical corporate governance is less effective
than traditional policy tools, it may be a useful complement to those
measures. It does not need to be the favored tool of policymakers in order
for it to be a worthwhile addition to the toolbox.79 To be useful,
countercyclical corporate governance only needs to outrun government
action,80 or show up for the race when the government does not. And even
when the government is prepared to act, countercyclical corporate
governance can make its interventions more effective. Indeed, as shown
below, actual leaders in business and government are increasingly recognizing
countercyclical corporate governance’s potential as a complementary tool.
III.

Early Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis

This Part analyzes measures adopted in response to the economic
crisis prompted by COVID-19. Proxy advisory firms, the government, and
corporations themselves took steps advancing a variety of stakeholder
interests. All of these measures could be understood as steps toward revising
corporate governance to meet the needs of the moment.

Cf. Paul Krugman, Stocks Are Soaring. So Is Misery., N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
20,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/opinion/stock-marketunemployment.html (noting that “only around 3 percent of the value investors
place on the company reflects the money they expect it to make over the course of
the next year”).
77
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
78
See supra notes 54 to 56 and accompanying text.
79
LISTOKIN, supra note 1 at 5; Masur & Posner, Should Regulation Be
Countercyclical?, supra note 1 at 880.
80
Liscow, supra note 1, develops this point extensively, suggesting that
bankruptcy reorganizations should be reworked to promote employment in a
recession if and only if the cost per job saved through this action would be lower
than the costs from government programs.
76
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Proxy Advisory Services and Shareholders

Proxy advisory services are firms that provide recommendations on
how shareholders should cast their votes on corporate decisions.81 Because
many passive institutional investors are unwilling to undertake a careful
analysis of every decision that is up for a vote, they rely heavily on the
recommendations of these services. The combination of the voting strength
of passive institutional investors and their reliance on advisors’
recommendations has placed enormous power in the hands of the two
leading providers, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass
Lewis. As a result, their positions carry enormous weight, and have been
analogized to a “civil code” regulating corporations on a broad range of
issues.82
Historically, ISS and Glass Lewis have reliably taken positions that
enhanced immediate shareholder power over corporate decision-making.
These positions have included support for a consequential campaign to
declassify or destagger corporate boards, so that all board members are
forced to seek election annually, and heavy skepticism of takeover defenses. 83
In a departure from their normal orientation, ISS and Glass Lewis
signaled openness to takeover defenses adopted as a result of financial
market dislocations that accompanied the coronavirus crisis. 84 In a policy
guidance document, ISS explained that under its “appropriately flexible”
approach, a “severe stock price decline as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic is likely to be considered valid justification in most cases for

Because relatively few shareholders attend shareholder meetings, most
vote by submitting a “proxy” which provides instructions as to how their vote should
be cast.
82
Neil Whoriskey, The New Civil Code: ISS and Glass Lewis as Lawmakers ,
CLS
BLUE
SKY
BLOG
(July
28,
2020),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/07/28/cleary-gottlieb-discusses-the-newcivil-code-of-iss-and-glass-lewis/
81

Id.
See Ofer Eldar & Michael D. Wittry, The Return of Poison Pills: An
Analysis of “Crisis Pills” Adopted in the COVID-19 Pandemic, DUKE L. SCH.
83
84

PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY SERIES 2020-18 (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3583428 at 4 (“In fact, even
proxy advisors, such as the ISS and Glass Lewis, have recently indicated that they
understand the potential justifications for pill adoptions in the wake of the
pandemic and will not automatically recommend withholding votes from directors
that adopt them as per their standard policies”).
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adopting a pill of less than one year in duration.” 85 Similarly, Glass Lewis
reaffirmed its general opposition to poison pills, but stated that it would
consider “companies that are impacted by the coronavirus and the related
economic crisis as reasonable context for adopting a poison pill” meeting
certain conditions.86
It is important to acknowledge the limits of this position. ISS and
Glass Lewis were not explicitly endorsing stakeholder governance, in which
poison pills could be deployed to protect stakeholder interests. And they
were not explicitly endorsing a paradigm in which corporations could set a
policy favoring stakeholders in a recession as part of an effort to end it. 87 They
were simply recognizing that dislocated financial markets would not set an
appropriate framework for corporate decisions.88 But the practical import
was to create space for corporate decision-makers to set policies that could
be opposed by shareholder activists.
As these changes occurred, many activist hedge funds backed down
on campaigns or struck friendly or constructive settlements. 89 With the

Institutional Shareholder Services Global Policy Board, Impacts of the
Pandemic
ISS
Policy
Guide
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/ISS-Policy-Guidancefor-Impacts-of-the-Coronavirus-Pandemic.pdf at 6.
86
Aaron Bertinetti, Poison Pills and Coronavirus: Understanding Glass
Lewis’ Contextual Policy Approach, GLASS LEWIS BLOG (April 8, 2020),
https://www.glasslewis.com/poison-pills-and-coronavirus-understanding-glass-lewiscontextual-policy-approach/.
87
Proxy advisory firms also did not approve of all takeover defenses. See
Eldar & Wittry, supra note 84 at 30-31 (“ISS still criticized the poison pill adopted
by the Williams Companies on the basis that the 5 percent trigger was very low”).
88
See id. at 6 (summarizing finding that poison pill adoption caused
abnormal shareholder returns).
89
See Edward B. Rock & Haley Sylvester, It’s Not the Time to Fight Over
Poison
Pills,
BLOOMBERG
OPINION
(Apr.
7,
2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-04-07/coronavirus-crisis-is-notthe-time-for-poison-pill-proxy-fights (“Many [activist investors] have voluntarily
walked away from planned attacks, or pursued constructive and friendly settlements
with target-company boards.”); Corrie Driebusch, Activists Lay Down Their Arms
as Companies Cope With Coronavirus Spread, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2020),
available
at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/activists-lay-down-their-arms-ascompanies-cope-with-coronavirus-spread-11585474201; cf. Melissa Sawyer, Marc
Trevino & Lauren Boehmke, 2020 U.S. Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Dec.
20,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/20/2020-u-s-shareholder-activism/
85

COVID-19
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possible exception of plaintiffs’ law firms and a few holdout activist funds, 90
even shareholders’ fiercest advocates appeared to recognize that they could
not and should not dictate the corporate agenda.
Index funds also sought to take a more patient approach.
BlackRock’s Investment Stewardship 2020 Annual Report explained:

As

For many companies, COVID-19 has created
near-term existential challenges. . . . In the
immediate response period, we were able to
be supportive as companies sought flexibility
from investors to weather the initial storm. 91
These efforts were described to investors as part of a re-examination of
corporate purpose that would help generate sustainable corporate value. 92 It
remains too early to tell whether there will be a lasting shift in the corporate
ecosystem. But some analysts suggested that a more sustainable outlook
might be the result.93

(noting that activists in 2020 also changed objectives, with activists focusing on
urging buybacks and some highlighting social concerns).
90
See William D. Savitt, Litigation Priorities and the Crisis, WACHTELL,
LIPTON,
ROSEN
&
KATZ
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/20200324/wachtelllitigationpri
oritiesmemo.pdf.
91
Michelle Edkins, Hilary Novik-Sandberg & Victoria Gaytan, Investment
Stewardship 2020 Annual Report, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Sep.
30,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/30/investmentstewardship-2020-annual-report/#more-133380.
92

Id.

For example, Barclays launched a Fundamental ESG Research offering
with a press release that observed “Prior to the outbreak of Covid-19, finance was
already at a tipping point, where the integration and sustainability concerns were
becoming the norm . . . . Today’s launch of Barclays’ Fundamental ESG Research
is an opportunity to reflect on whether Covid-19 will accelerate this trend even
further—creating a greater sense of urgency and responsibility toward everything
from consumer behavior to climate change, supply-chain practices and the future
of work and mobility—and potentially alter the nature of the investment process as
a result.” “Barclays Adds ESG Assessment and Indicators to Fundamental
Research,”
BUSINESSWIRE
(Mar.
24,
2020),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200324005224/en/Barclays-AddsESG-Assessment-Indicators-Fundamental-Research
93
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B.

Government

Government action in response to the crisis has also been instructive.
Over the course of the crisis, federal support has been both critical to the
survival of businesses and largely premised on a particular vision of the
purpose of those businesses in society. Government support was intended
to help employees and customers, not shareholders. As President Donald
Trump explained:
I don’t want to give a bailout to a company and
then have somebody go out and use that
money to buy stock in the company and raise
the price and then get a bonus. . . . So I may
be Republican, but I don’t like that. I want
them to use the money for the workers. 94
Congress’s phase three stimulus package, the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) thus provided financial
support to businesses with the express understanding that the support
provided under certain programs should not be channeled to shareholders
but rather to other stakeholders.95 For example, the Federal Reserve’s Main
Street Lending Facility was designed to encourage the flow of credit to
medium sized businesses by committing the Federal Reserve to purchasing
qualifying loans.96 By statute, a loan would only qualify for purchase under
the facility if the business that received the loan committed to limitations on
share repurchases and capital distributions.97 Similarly, the Treasury
Department’s support to airlines under the CARES Act included provisions
Erica Werner, Seung Min Kim, Rachel Bade & Jeff Stein, Senate falls far
short of votes needed to advance coronavirus bill, as clash between Republicans
and
Democrats
intensifies,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
22,
2020),
94

https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/03/22/vast-coronavirus-stimulusbill-limbo-crunch-times-arrives-capitol-hill/.
95
Various provisions in the CARES Act were intended to ensure that
recipients of financial assistance would not make payments to equity holders or
reduce employment levels. See, e.g., CARES Act §§ 4003(c)(2)(E)-(F), (c)(3)(A)(ii),
(c)(3)(D), 4114(a)(2)-(3) (limitations on dividends and stock buybacks by
beneficiaries); 4003(c)(2)(G), (c)(3)(D)(i)(III), 4114(a)(1) (requirements on
maintaining or restoring employment levels).
96
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Main Street New
Loan
Facility
Term
Sheet
(July
28,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200728a
3.pdf at 3.
97
CARES Act § 4003(c)(3)(A)(ii).
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requiring the airlines to prioritize support for workers and customers over
servicing shareholders.98 Such conditions have precedents in prior
government responses to macroeconomic crises.99
The CARES Act and Federal Reserve program provisions could be
understood as efforts to protect the integrity of the government’s
macroeconomic interventions, and to limit potentially perverse side effects. 100
That reading is supported by the federal government’s failure to impose
similar restrictions on support provided under other programs. 101 It is also
unclear how effective these efforts have been, 102 or whether it would be
practical to apply such restrictions to other measures designed to prop up
corporate borrowing.103 But the restrictions do suggest a particular
understanding of the purpose of the corporation during periods of
98

See, e.g., Delta Airlines, Inc., Form 8-K (Apr. 22, 2020) (“The payroll

support payments are conditioned on Delta’s agreement to refrain from conducting
involuntary employee layoffs or furloughs through September 30, 2020. Other
conditions include prohibitions on share repurchases and dividends through
September 30, 2021, continuing essential air service . . . and certain limitations on
executive compensation.”).
99
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 40 at 1307 (quoting General Motors
description of conditions placed on it by the United States Treasury).
100
See supra Part II.B.2. In the case of loans that were intended to be repaid,
the provisions could also have the benefit of protecting taxpayers’ capital.
101
See Amanda Fischer, Main Street’s workers, families, and small businesses

are now suffering as Wall Street prospers from policies to fight the coronavirus
recession,
EQUITABLE
GROWTH
(Sep.
17,
2020),

https://equitablegrowth.org/main-streets-workers-families-and-small-businessesare-now-suffering-as-wall-street-prospers-from-policies-to-fight-the-coronavirusrecession/; Jim Zarroli, The Fed Helped Companies Borrow Money. Some Laid
Off
Thousands
Anyway,
NPR
(June
10,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/873190315/the-fed-is-throwing-money-aroundnot-everyone-is-reaping-the-benefits; Jeff Stein & Peter Whoriskey, The U.S. plans

to lend $500 billion to large companies. It won’t require them to preserve jobs or
limit executive pay., WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2020),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/28/federal-reserve-bondcorporations/; Michael Grunwald, The corporate bailout doesn’t include the limits
Democrats
promised,
POLITICO
(Apr.
2,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/02/coronavirus-corporate-bailout-deal161374
102
Cf. Dharmapala, Foley & Forbes, supra note 42 at 757 (finding that
government restrictions on use of repatriated funds in a prior tax holiday had
limited effectiveness in changing financial policy at affected firms).
103
See supra note 101 (collecting sources regarding the Federal Reserve’s
refusal to impose such conditions with respect to certain financial facilities).
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macroeconomic crisis. At least for the duration of the crisis, corporations
became tools for policymakers to channel support and services to
stakeholders, not tools for shareholders to generate immediate financial
returns for themselves.104
Former Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine — a jurist who has written
influential pronouncements that shareholder primacy is legally required
under Delaware law105 — gestured toward this emerging paradigm in an op-ed
emphasizing that businesses had an obligation to follow the government’s
lead in addressing the crisis, instead of using the crisis as an opportunity to
frustrate government purposes or derive excessive shareholder profits. 106
Again, it would be incorrect to take this as an endorsement of a
general countercyclical corporate governance regime. The unique challenges
of the COVID-19 crisis — which threatened lives as well as livelihoods — may
have supported extraordinary measures, and protecting long term
shareholders by defending the viability of the business fits easily within
standard shareholder primacy thinking. But it again suggests a recognition
among thought leaders that government action called for a reorientation of
corporate priorities.
C.

Businesses

Business leaders themselves seemed to appreciate this reality during
the early days of the COVID-19 crisis, and properly prioritized the health of
their employees, customers, and suppliers.107 Businesses facing liquidity or
solvency concerns also worked to resolve those issues with creditors.
104

Cf. Casey & Posner, supra note 34 at 488 (describing this type of

intervention as a bailout or subsidy for stakeholders, depending on whether the
intent is to solve a liquidity crisis among stakeholders); id. at 505 (considering
possibility that the airline bailout after the September 11, 2001 attacks “was a form
of humanitarian relief for airline stakeholders, akin to government support for
individuals and businesses struck by a natural disaster like a hurricane”).
105
See, e.g., Strine, Dangers of Denial, supra note 15.
106
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Remembering what comes first is more important than
ever, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/9ee6d82e6fc2-11ea-89df41bea055720b?emailId=5e7ddd98753e510004780143&segmentId=a8cbd2581d42-1845-7b82-00376a04c08f.
107
See Sarah Keohane Williamson, A Hierarchy of Stakeholder Needs,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 22, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/22/a-hierarchy-of-stakeholder-needs/
(suggesting a prioritization of needs of competing stakeholders, and presenting
results of surveys of businesses).
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Businesses also turned to antitakeover devices like the poison pill to defend
their strategies against activist attacks.108
Some of this was simple necessity. Equity markets swung wildly based
on news events that were largely outside the control of any given business
firm. In many cases, the very survival of the business enterprise — and thus,
all hope for a financial return to equity — required leaders to get their
approach to stakeholders right. Such measures can thus be justified as efforts
to maximize shareholder value.109
But these actions suggested that the crisis context had normalized a
revised approach to corporate decision-making, in which businesses sought
to prioritize stakeholders apart from shareholders. Prominent companies
also sought to emphasize these efforts and present them as part of a
thoughtful and enlightened strategy; they did not seek to present them as
emergency measures that they had been forced into by dire conditions. 110

Eldar & Wittry, supra note 84.
See id. (noting that shareholders frequently enjoyed superior returns in the
wake of adoption of poison pills); cf. Scott Guernsey, Simone M. Sepe & Matthew
Serfling, Blood in the Water: The Value of Antitakeover Provisions During Market
Shocks
(Oct.
28,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3716995 (finding that various
firms with antitakeover measures in place have smaller declines in stock price after
a shock).
110
See, e.g., Amazon, Amazon’s COVID-19 blog: updates on how we’re
responding to the crisis (Oct. 21, 2020), https://blog.aboutamazon.com/companynews/amazons-actions-to-help-employees-communities-and-customers-affected-bycovid-19 (describing measures like one-time bonuses totaling $500 million, time off
for employees diagnosed with COVID-19, and a $25 million relief fund for certain
employees facing hardship). Various companies also made more traditional
donations. See Medea Giordano, The Nonprofits and Companies Helping to
Fight the Pandemic, WIRED (May 7, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/covid-19charities-nonprofits-companies-helping/.
108
109
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IV.

Private Implementations

This Part considers shareholder engagement as a mechanism for
bringing about corporate governance arrangements that are responsive to
macroeconomic crises. Part IV.A identifies institutional voices that might
advocate a countercyclical approach. Part IV.B considers what policy they
might advocate for — a consistent approach in which stakeholders are always
considered, or a switching approach in which the degree of stakeholder
consideration depends on the business cycle. Part IV.C considers the
mechanics of implementation. Part IV.D identifies ways that the law could
support these steps.
A.

Potential Shareholder Advocates

Various institutional investors have the means and incentive to
advocate for countercyclical corporate governance. Index funds are the most
promising potential advocates, though pension funds and bond funds might
also play a role.
Index funds establish a portfolio that passively tracks a target index in
the marketplace, such as the S&P 500. Instead of actively trading — trying to
identify undervalued or overvalued shares and buying or selling accordingly
— in an effort to generate outsized returns, these funds simply try to replicate
the returns from the index, and charge investors a modest fee to do so. These
products allow investors to cheaply and easily hold a diversified portfolio that
reflects the performance of the overall economy. The funds have become
increasingly popular. The “Giant Three” index fund providers, Blackrock,
State Street, and Vanguard, hold a combined total of approximately 20% of
the shares of S&P 500 companies, and cast approximately 25% of the votes. 111
Professor John C. Coates, IV has suggested that consolidation in the space
will soon result in the twelve largest providers controlling a majority of U.S.
public companies.112

See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of
Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029,
2033, 2106 (2019); Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three,
111

99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 724 (2019). Because index funds vote all of their shares and
ordinary investors do not, they routinely cast a disproportionate fraction of the
votes. Id.
112
John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The
Problem of Twelve, HARV. PUB. L. WORKING PAPER NO. 19-07 (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337.
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Admittedly, index funds have real constraints on their engagement
with the companies in their portfolio.113 Index funds principally compete on
cost: investors rationally seek to buy in to funds that charge low fees, so funds
prefer not to incur the cost of active stewardship of portfolio companies.
Index funds also cannot take a disproportionate stake in a given company,
and so must share any benefits created by their engagement.
Despite these constraints, index fund stakes do appear to affect
corporate conduct. For example, there is evidence that firms behave
differently when their shareholders also hold stock in their competitors.
Company executives are compensated in ways that reflect industry
performance instead of performance at their companies, and there have been
claims that companies charge their customers higher prices because
competition is muted.114
Index funds have a real incentive to use their power to support a
countercyclical regime. First, an investor in an index fund would have little
to gain and much to lose from an ordinary shareholder primacy approach in
a recession. Returning capital to shareholders through dividends or share
repurchases does little for investors in a bad economic environment, when
there are few profitable investment opportunities available. 115 And if index
fund investors keep dividend or buyback payments in the fund — as they are
likely to do, given that the purpose of an index fund strategy is to simply hold
passively for decades instead of actively allocating capital — they have nothing
to gain from the inflated prices.116
At the same time, the actual human beings whose capital is deployed
through index funds would have much to lose. Most derive a majority of
their wealth from salaries instead of financial assets, and so would suffer from
persistent high unemployment.117 An index fund that focused on its investors’
Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance,
supra note 111. But see John C. Bogle, Reflections on “Toward Common Sense
and Common Ground?”, 33 J. CORP. L. 31, 37 n.10 (2007) (cost should not be an
113

obstacle to engagement if index funds choose to intervene).
114
See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267
(2016). There are areas where effects are more muted. See Philippe Aghion, John
Van Reenen & Luigi Zingales, Innovation and Institutional Ownership, 103 AM.
ECON. REV. 277, 278 (2013) (institutional ownership generally has a positive
impact on research and development spending and productivity, but index fund
ownership has no effect).
115
See supra notes 46 to 48 and accompanying text.
116
Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?, supra note 46 at 1912.
117

Id.
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needs would prioritize measures to boost employment in a recession over
measures to boost share prices at a particular company.
Second, index fund investors also have financial interests apart from
their stake in any particular company. Index fund investors are diversified:
an investor in a fund that tracks the S&P 500 at least has exposure to the
shares of the 500 companies that make up that index. They only have reason
to care about systemic risks which affect the performance of the economy as
a whole, not idiosyncratic risks at particular companies. Index funds have
already taken an interest in systemic issues like climate change and social
instability.118 A persistent macroeconomic downturn would have a similarly
systemic impact, and index funds have reason to focus on macroeconomic
crises in order to improve their returns.
Finally, index funds could use countercyclical corporate governance
to improve their competitive position vis-à-vis other index funds. Index funds
have relatively few ways to differentiate themselves, as they all seek to
replicate the returns from set indices. At the same time, they are eagerly
seeking ways to market themselves to the rising millennial generation of
investors, including by engaging in advocacy on social issues 119 and climate
change. Millennials have been uniquely damaged by recent macroeconomic
crises,120 and are likely to respond positively to index funds that seek to
mitigate them.
Importantly, the marketing motivation for index fund action applies
even if it is unclear whether the action will boost overall returns. Index funds
like State Street mounted a forceful campaign for gender equity on corporate
boards without citing clear-cut evidence that it would impact financial
performance121 or developing a strategy carefully tailored to maximize
John C. Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership,
and Systematic Risk, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 602 (2021); Madison Condon,
Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2020).
Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s):
Index Fund Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL.
118

119

L. REV. 101 (2020).
120
See, e.g., Janet Adamy, Millennials Slammed by Second Financial Crisis
Fall Even Further Behind, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/millennials-covid-financial-crisis-fall-behind-jobless11596811470; Annie Lowrey, Millennials Don’t Stand a Chance, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/millennialsare-new-lost-generation/609832/.
121
See Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California’s “Women
on Boards” Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG.
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financial impact.122 The index funds were motivated to pursue the social value
of diversity even where the financial value was not clear.
While index funds have powerful incentives to support
countercyclical corporate governance, the incentives are limited by
divergences between the wealth of index fund investors and social wealth.
The stock market is not the economy. During the COVID-19 crisis, stock
indices reached record highs even as unemployment reached historic levels.
Index fund performance thus seems insulated from macroeconomic
performance. And the harms from a macroeconomic crisis are also not
evenly distributed, with the wealthy people who are likely to hold index funds
being relatively less affected.
Still, such divergences are unlikely to persist over an extended period,
which is the relevant time horizon for a long term investor pursuing a buy
and hold strategy supported by index funds. At some point, the economy
must grow for investors to reap gains. The divergences also would not make
financial chicanery any more attractive to index fund investors, or eliminate
index funds’ marketing incentive to engage constructively.
But while there are sound theoretical reasons for index funds to
support countercyclical corporate governance, the clearest proof of their
incentive structure is their support for stakeholder governance and for
macroeconomic stimulus. Even without a recession, major index funds
endorsed a “new paradigm” in which corporations would seek to care for
stakeholders other than shareholders and seek to serve social purposes
beyond immediate shareholder wealth maximization.123 During the COVID19 crisis, index funds put this patient approach into practice, recognizing the
L. REV. 493 (2019) (“the results of empirical studies evaluating the relationship
between female board representation and corporate economic performance have
been ‘largely inconclusive’”). But see Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and

Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America’s Boardrooms and
What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1587 (2004) (“Diversity in

the boardroom enhances corporate profitability according to the consensus of
scholars of business management, finance, and economics.”).
122
See Barzuza, Curtis & Webber, supra note 119 at 123 (index funds
appeared indifferent to considerations that would impact the value of board
diversity, such as whether a particular company was consumer-facing or not).
123
William D. Savitt & Aneil Kovvali, On the Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 1881 (2021). For an example of this type of
advocacy, see Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Jan.
16,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/16/a-fundamental-reshaping-of-finance/.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4043883

42

FORTHCOMING N.C. L. REV.

need for corporate leaders to prioritize non-shareholder constituencies for
the duration of the crisis.124 And the leaders of index funds have been
attentive to issues of macroeconomic policy, publicly urging stimulus where
needed.125
Other institutional voices could also use their economic clout to
advocate for stakeholder interests, but their views are likely to be more
parochial. Pension funds might serve as advocates for worker positions.126
While bond funds cannot cast shareholder votes, they could also use their
economic clout to advocate for creditor interests. But pension funds’
interests may skew toward longstanding employees or retirees instead of
capturing the needs of the overall labor market. And in advocating for
creditors, bond funds might be unhelpful during a macroeconomic crisis. 127

See Edkins, Novik-Sandberg & Gaytan, supra note 91.
See Saqib Iqbal Ahmed, Economic recovery further away than markets
think:
BlackRock
CEO
Fink,
REUTERS
(July
17,
2020),
124
125

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blackrock-results-fink/economic-recoveryfurther-away-than-markets-think-blackrock-ceo-fink-idUSKCN24I20E
(quoting
Fink as stating that “There is going to be a need for some kind of stimulus for job
creation.”); Dawn Lim, BlackRock’s Larry Fink Makes Case for Government
Infrastructure
Stimulus,
MORNINGSTAR
(May
27,
2020),
https://www.morningstar.com/news/dow-jones/202005279122/blackrocks-larryfink-makes-case-for-government-infrastructure-stimulus.
126
See David H. Webber, Reforming Pensions While Retaining Shareholder
Voice, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1001 (2019) (urging that pension funds should be supported
and supplemented in effort to use shareholder voice to advance labor interests);
Stephen F. Diamond, Exercising the ‘governance option’: labour’s new push to
reshape financial capitalism, 43 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 891 (2019) (documenting
labor’s increased use of “governance option” embedded in common stock to tilt
balance of power in modern corporations); DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE
WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (2018).
127
See supra Part II.C.2.
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Potential Approaches

Institutional voices would ideally seek adoption of a disciplined
variant of stakeholder governance, in which corporate leaders deploy
resources to various stakeholders in response to macroeconomic crises. This
concept could be pursued in two basic ways. Corporations could maintain a
consistent stakeholder governance orientation, weighing the needs of
stakeholders in good times as well as bad, or they could switch between
shareholder and stakeholder focused regimes based on context.

1.

Consistent Approach

Under a consistent or time-invariant approach, disciplined
stakeholder governance would be encouraged in both good times and bad
times. This could entail engaging with companies to select stakeholderfriendly directors and officers; setting long-term compensation criteria based
on employee, environmental, social, and governance criteria that are aligned
to macroeconomic performance; and encouraging the development of
stakeholder-friendly norms.
A consistent approach would avoid debates about whether a
triggering macroeconomic crisis has started, and it would avoid delays in
implementation. Instead of having to identify a crisis, engage with
corporations to shift governance regimes, and wait to have those changes take
effect, index funds could simply count on existing measures. Given that
dispatch is one of the benefits of a private stimulus as compared to a
traditional fiscal stimulus, a consistent approach may do more to capitalize
on the strengths of countercyclical corporate governance.128
The counterarguments to this approach are similar to the normal
criticisms of stakeholder governance.129 In a good macroeconomic
A consistent approach might have other benefits, such as additional
credibility to employees. If employees believe that they have some protection
against a layoff in the event of an economic downturn, they will be more likely to
make firm- and industry-specific investments that increase worker productivity but
that are difficult for the worker to keep in the event of a layoff. See Masur & Posner,
Unemployment, supra note 7 at 607-08. Similarly a firm that made credible
commitments might be able to pay lower wages, because its workers will no longer
need to be compensated ex ante for the risk of a layoff. Cf. id. at 621 (“Economists
hypothesize that employers pay a wage premium to workers that compensate them
for the risk of layoff.”). These effects do not necessarily depend on a stakeholder
versus a shareholder orientation for the firm.
129
See supra Part I.A.
128
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environment, it may contribute to inefficient expenditures. It would also lead
to concerns about indeterminacy. Absent a clear goal like delivering useful
macroeconomic stimulus in an environment where stimulus would do real
good, stakeholder governance may not provide a criterion for corporate
decisions. This would create confusion and managerial slack. But even
macroeconomic environments that seem like peaks, in which there is no
benefit to further stimulus, may actually be susceptible to improvement. 130 In
addition, an approach that lowers some of the peaks in the business cycle as
a cost of raising some of the troughs would be countercyclical. Trading some
of the gain from a peak to avoid some of the pain of a trough would be a
reasonable approach.

2.

Switching Approach

Under a switching approach, a shareholder focus would apply in good
times, but disciplined stakeholder governance would be encouraged in bad
times. An approach that switched between a shareholder and stakeholder
focus based on the macroeconomic environment could be implemented as
easily as announcing a supportive approach during a crisis and voting
accordingly. Deeper measures might include engagement with companies
undertaking layoffs during a recession, and with companies that are sitting on
capital or returning it to shareholders.
A switching approach would allow the economy to reap the benefits
of a close focus on efficiency during good economic times and the benefits
of a private stimulus during bad economic times. An efficiency focus during
periods of strong macroeconomic performance could also help ensure that
wasteful or inefficient projects are regularly cleared out, and that workers and
consumers expect a return to normalcy during a crisis. 131

For example, economists had been skeptical that there was slack in the
economy at the end of the Obama administration, thus stifling government policy
that could have boosted employment. But after the Trump administration
delivered further fiscal stimulus and a friendly Federal Reserve took a patient
approach, unemployment rates dropped further. See, e.g., Why American
unemployment is so low, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/12/10/why-americanunemployment-is-so-low (crediting fiscal stimulus and patient monetary policy for
driving unemployment rate to 3.7% even though economists had previously
estimated that unemployment rates below 5% would cause accelerating inflation).
131
See infra note 253 for a discussion of some of the macroeconomic benefits
of improved expectations.
130

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4043883

COUNTERCYCLICAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

45

However, the cleansing effect during periods of strong economic
performance could go too far, with firms reducing capital reserves in good
periods to ensure that there are no reserves left over in bad periods to direct
to other constituencies.
It would also be difficult to implement a switching approach. It would
take time to recognize a macroeconomic crisis and react to it. Incentives
could also create problems. Part of the reason for an index fund to pursue a
countercyclical approach would be a reputational benefit; 132 that benefit
would be eroded if the fund was perceived as adopting a ruthless shareholderfocused approach during any part of the business cycle. Stakeholder
governance also normally relies on norms and understandings within the
business community, to inculcate a sense of responsibility and cause leaders
to internalize their obligations to stakeholders;133 it may not be possible to
create strong understandings that can be toggled like a switch. Still, there are
potential responses. Macroeconomic policy would have low salience to
consumers during the peak of the business cycle. And the idea that
businesses should do more to protect their communities during a crisis is a
natural one that may be adopted by business leaders.
C.

Installing the Approach

Advocates might use three broad categories of tools to install a
countercyclical approach. First, index funds can announce positions and
exhort business leaders to follow them. Major index funds have a bully pulpit
within the business community, and are familiar with using that pulpit to urge
revisions to corporate governance arrangements. For example, Larry Fink,
the leader of BlackRock, has emphasized the need for businesses to have a
sense of purpose, and to focus on sustainability in order to be profitable in
the long term.134 Even standing alone, statements of this type serve a valuable
function in coordinating activities and developing norms. Business leaders
can be encouraged to use their discretion to orient themselves toward
stakeholders, can be pointed toward a common approach that will be more
impactful, and can be reassured that they will not be going it alone if they do
take action.135
Second, index funds can use their votes. Withholding, or threatening
to withhold, votes from directors at companies that fail to adopt a
132
133
134

note 91.
135

See supra Part IV.A.
See Savitt & Kovvali, supra note 123.
Fink, supra note 123; see also Edkins, Novik-Sandberg & Gaytan, supra
See Savitt & Kovvali, supra note 123.
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countercyclical approach would send a powerful message. Voting in
connection with merger transactions and activist efforts could also be an
important lever. Funds could oppose transactions that are based on
operational synergies that will reduce employment, either by voting against
deals that need to be approved at target companies or by backing
management in defending against such offers. While relatively few
companies will be involved in such transactions, a few interventions would be
sufficient to send a strong and meaningful message. 136
Third, index funds could undertake more intensive stewardship
activities, actively monitoring and engaging with companies. For example, a
fund could select companies with high potential to deliver stimulus and either
engage with management proactively or defensively upon announcements of
potential job cuts.137
Critics might question the ability of index funds to implement this
approach through more intensive stewardship.138 The countercyclical
corporate governance approach would also place new demands on their
operations by requiring them to form views on macroeconomic issues.
The capacity of index funds to implement the approach will depend
in part on the precise approach taken. Index funds probably could not
actively engage on a broad array of business issues with every company
represented in their portfolio. But issuing a clear statement of their approach
then engaging in targeted and high profile interventions would send the same
message and create similar incentives.
The differences in approach are analogous to the differences between
the “police patrol” and “fire alarm” models of political oversight. 139 In a police
patrol model, the supervisor actively looks for possible infractions, thus
Indeed, transactions are one of the few contexts in which Delaware courts
have sent a clear signal in favor of shareholder primacy. See infra Part IV.D.1-2.
137
This approach could leverage existing notices that are required by law.
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (“WARN Act”)
requires covered employers to provide 60 days’ notice of layoffs and plant closings.
29 U.S.C. § 2102.
138
See supra notes 113 to 114 and accompanying text.
139
See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights , 113 COLUM. L. REV.
863, 896 (2013) (suggesting that activist funds identify problems and prompt index
funds to act).
136
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expending resources on investigating many situations where there has been
no infraction. In a fire alarm model, the supervisor responds to infractions
after they have been identified by key constituencies. This requires much
less active monitoring, and makes it easier to claim credit with the
constituencies that are affected. Index funds plainly have the capacity to
respond if the problem is obvious or others sound the alarm, even if they
lack the capacity to proactively patrol the corporate landscape for possible
issues.
Admittedly, index funds would need to formulate policies based on
macroeconomics. But funds should be able to attract and use the necessary
expertise. Indeed, the leaders of index fund companies already have fluency
in macroeconomic concepts, and are comfortable opining on
macroeconomic policies.140 Difficult decisions could also be outsourced to
competent bodies like the Federal Reserve. For example, instead of reaching
an independent judgment about the state of the economy, index funds could
commit to acting when the federal funds rate drops below some threshold
near 0%.141
D.

Adjustments to Corporate and Securities Law

As noted above, shareholder primacy is the conventional model for
understanding Delaware corporate law. This section urges that shareholder
primacy should not be an obstacle to a shareholder implementation of
countercyclical corporate governance, and turns to adjustments that would
provide further support.

140

markets

See, e.g., Saqib Iqbal Ahmed, Economic recovery further away than
think: BlackRock CEO Fink, REUTERS (July 17, 2020),

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blackrock-results-fink/economic-recoveryfurther-away-than-markets-think-blackrock-ceo-fink-idUSKCN24I20E
(quoting
Fink as stating that “There is going to be a need for some kind of stimulus for job
creation.”); Dawn Lim, BlackRock’s Larry Fink Makes Case for Government
Infrastructure
Stimulus,
MORNINGSTAR
(May
27,
2020),
https://www.morningstar.com/news/dow-jones/202005279122/blackrocks-larryfink-makes-case-for-government-infrastructure-stimulus.
141
See Masur & Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, supra note
1 at 891 (“One final option is to trigger regulatory suspension when the federal
funds rate is very low—at or near 0%. . . . This approach effectively allows agencies
to piggyback on the expertise of the Fed in setting rates.”).
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1.

Consistency with Current Law

Delaware law would not prevent actual shareholders from
implementing a countercyclical approach. Delaware jurists routinely caution
that corporate actors are normally required to prioritize the interests of
shareholders above all other constituencies.142 But Delaware law does not
require corporations to maximize short term share price, or to submit all
corporate decisions to continuous shareholder referenda.143 Between those
two clear boundaries is a wide range of possibilities. Shareholder primacy
could be understood as a set of mandatory commands designed to advance
the narrow financial interests of an idealized shareholder, or as an approach
that permits private ordering by the shareholders themselves. 144
Although some cases give succor to the mandatory view, the broader
tendency of Delaware law is toward private ordering by the shareholders. 145
For example, Delaware courts have become more deferential in their review
of transactions that have been approved by a vote of informed disinterested
shareholders.146 Delaware’s public benefit corporation statute has similarly
been amended to permit a simple majority of shareholders to reframe a
142
143

See Strine, Dangers of Denial, supra note 15 at 768.
Id. at 764 (“directors are generally empowered to manage the corporation

in a way that is not dictated by what will best maximize the corporation’s current
stock price”).
144
Ann M. Lipton, What We Talk About When We Talk About
Shareholder Primacy, 69 CASE W. RESERVE L. REV. 863 (2019) (distinguishing
between shareholder primacy as approach that permits shareholders to have their
way and approach in which courts enforce particular conception of what
shareholders want).
145
See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate
Law And Some Of The New Challenges We (And Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 673, 674 (2005) (“Consistent with a contractarian vision, our statute is, by design,
a broad enabling one that permits and facilitates company-specific procedures. In
other words, our statute is much different than one might find in a civil law nation,
which would more likely have a prescriptive corporation law chock full of
mandatory terms specifying exactly how corporations must conduct their
business.”).
146
See Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015)
(uncoerced and informed vote of disinterested shareholders approving transaction
bars suit for breach of fiduciary duty); Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d
635 (Del. 2014) (going private merger by a controlling shareholder is subject to
deferential business judgment review instead of searching entire fairness review
when the transaction was negotiated by a special committee of independent
directors and conditioned on approval of a majority of the minority shareholders);
Lipton, supra note 144 at 871-72.
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corporation’s purpose and make it explicitly responsive to stakeholder
interests.147
At a more basic level, it is hard to imagine a Delaware court holding
anyone liable for pursuing an expansionary business plan during a recession.
Resisting layoffs, expanding production or investment, or pursuing a risky
project are fairly standard business strategies that are generally subject to
highly deferential review under the business judgment rule.148 To the extent
any shareholders disagree with the strategy set by the directors and officers,
they can obtain relief not from legal restrictions but through voting.

2.

Removing Uncertainty

Properly understood, Delaware law would not block a countercyclical
corporate governance scheme backed by shareholders like index funds. But
there are Delaware precedents that are routinely cited in opposition to
stakeholder governance, and that may be used by opponents of a
countercyclical approach. Contextualizing those cases would remove
uncertainty and would make a countercyclical governance scheme more
effective.
For a brief period, Delaware courts seemed prepared to allow
corporate boards to deploy defensive measures to prevent corporate raiders
Delaware
House
Bill
341
(July
16,
2020),
https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=48122.
148
Under the business judgment rule, courts generally will not attempt to
second guess a decision that corporate directors and officers make in good faith to
advance the interests of the enterprise. This principle is easily rationalized under
the shareholder primacy paradigm. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in
the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) (“even a legal regime that
seeks only to maximize shareholder profits would provide the sort of business
judgment rule deference that inevitably allows latent profit-sacrificing discretion to
exist”); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16 at 93 (“Behind the business
judgment rule lies recognition that investors’ wealth would be lower if managers’
decisions were routinely subjected to strict judicial review”). But the rule also
prevents judicial review of many corporate decisions that benefit stakeholders. See
STOUT, supra note 16 at 29 (“‘The Business Judgment Rule’ Rules Out
Shareholder Primacy”). For example, when Henry Ford introduced a wage of $5
per work day for employees of the Ford Motor Company, he arguably transferred
wealth from the company’s shareholders to its workers. M. Todd Henderson, The
Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old Is New Again, in
CORPORATE LAW STORIES 37, 50-51 (J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., 2009). But the
decision would be shielded under the business judgment rule as a justifiable effort
to improve worker efficiency and generate good publicity. Id.
147
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from harming non-shareholder constituencies.149 But in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,150 the Delaware Supreme Court
suggested that there were limits on the extent to which a corporate board
could consider such constituencies: a “board may have regard for various
constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally
related benefits accruing to the stockholders. . . . However, such concern for
non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active
bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.”151 As a result, the
Revlon board was not permitted to end the auction. 152
As others have observed,153 Revlon arose in a unique context where a
sale and break up of the corporation had become inevitable. That context
had the effect of flattening out the heterogeneous preferences of shareholders
— there was no competition between investors with short and long time
horizons, because the company would not exist in the long term — and
ensuring that no corporate policy benefitting stakeholder interests would
endure. Put differently, in Revlon, the only benefit that shareholders could
derive from the corporation was the highest possible sales price; as a result,
the board was required to have a single-minded focus on that goal. By
contrast, shareholders urging a corporation to act in a countercyclical mode
would have much to gain from corporate policies that expand employment
and promote economic activity, and Revlon would not preclude corporate
actors from meeting those needs.
The eBay case154 provides a more complex statement on corporate
priorities. eBay purchased a stake in craigslist in August 2004; the other two
shareholders, Craig Newmark (“Craig”) and James Buckmaster (“Jim”)
together owned a majority of the shares and controlled the board. 155 After
eBay opened a competing business, Craig and Jim caused craigslist to adopt
various measures in 2008, including a poison pill that prevented eBay from
ever acquiring more shares.156 Craig and Jim defended the plan as necessary
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)
(takeover defenses can be justified by concerns including “the impact on
‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e. creditors, customers, employees, and
perhaps even the community generally)”).
150
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
149

151
152
153
154
155
156

Id.
Id. at 185.
E.g., STOUT, supra note 16 at 31.

eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
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to protect the corporate culture of craigslist, which was based on the website
refusing to monetize services. The court rejected that explanation,
concluding that Craig and Jim had failed to prove the existence of a corporate
culture “that sufficiently promotes stockholder value to support the indefinite
implementation of a poison pill.”157 The board could not justify a poison pill
using a corporate policy of refusing to monetize the website, given that the
policy “admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit
Delaware corporation for the benefit of its shareholders.” 158 The court also
held that the poison pill would be an unreasonable way to pursue the stated
purpose, as Craig and Jim could keep the culture in place as long as they held
their shares and retained control.159
The eBay case generated substantial critical commentary,160 and there
are many contexts in which it is problematic for an entity to be unable to
credibly commit to maintaining a non-economic policy even after its existing
shareholders have departed.161 But regardless of eBay’s impact on the general
project of stakeholder governance, it does not prevent implementation of a
countercyclical corporate governance approach in which the current
shareholders urge the corporation to enact policies that advance their purely
economic interests.
The events surrounding Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas,
Inc., are relevant to the overall framework. Beginning in 2009, Air Products
sought to acquire Airgas, another supplier of gasses and related goods. 163 The
approach turned public and hostile, with Air Products launching a tender
offer for Airgas shares that was conditioned on the Airgas board dismantling
its takeover defenses.164 Air Products repeatedly raised its offer price, and
even persuaded Airgas shareholders to elect three nominees selected by Air
162

Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
E.g., Anthony J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of
“Team” Production of Corporate Governance, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 365, 388
157
158
159
160

(2015).

See, e.g., Emilie Aguirre, Beyond Profit, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2077
(2021); Ann Lipton, Benefit Corporations Go Public, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (July
18,
2020),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2020/07/benefitcorporations-go-public.html.
162
16 A.3d 48 (Del. 2011).
163
Id. at 63.
164
Id. at 68-69.
161
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Products to the Airgas board.165 Yet the Airgas board — including the three
Air Products nominees — insisted on maintaining a poison pill takeover
defense that prevented the tender offer from going through. 166
The Delaware Chancery Court upheld the Airgas board’s actions
after concluding that it was a reasonable response to the threat that a majority
of shareholders might choose to tender into an offer at an inadequate price. 167
The court reached the conclusion with apparent reluctance, stating explicitly
that Airgas shareholders were fully informed and had taken enough time to
consider the Air Products offer.168 But it held that because the board had
made the required showings of good faith and a legitimate threat from
inadequate price, the board was justified in “blocking the tender offer and
forcing the bidder to elect a board majority that supports its bid.” 169
This result seems to be a decisive refutation of shareholder primacy. 170
But if the shareholder-oriented language of Delaware decisions is taken
seriously, the case actually presents a challenge for stakeholder governance.
It suggests that Delaware law enforces some concept of shareholders’
interests that is abstracted away from the actual expressed preferences of the
shareholders themselves.171 Even where shareholders seemed to have placed
directors on the board in order to clear the way for a sale,172 the board was
permitted to take actions for the specific purpose of preventing shareholders
from voluntarily selling their shares. The court seemed to recognize a
platonic purpose of the corporation, divorced from shareholders’ actual
views, which directors were empowered to defend. Such a reading might
suggest that countercyclical corporate governance could be barred by courts,
even if it is accepted by key shareholders like index funds.

Id. at 77. Because Airgas had a staggered board structure, prevailing in
one election was not sufficient to gain majority control.
166
Id. at 90.
167
Id. at 55.
168
Id. at 57.
169
Id. at 54.
170
See STOUT, supra note 16 at 30.
171
For a more extreme, though more obscure, example, see Lipton, supra
note 144 at 863-65 (discussing In re PLX Tech. Shareholders Litig., No. 9880VCL, 2018 WL 5018535, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018) (V.C. Laster), aff’d, 2019
WL 2144476 (Del. May 16, 2019)).
172
The Airgas court did note some ambiguity in the platform of the new
directors. Air Products ran the three as “independent directors who promised to
take a ‘fresh look,’” not as directors who would dismantle the takeover defense. 16
A.3d at 123.
165

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4043883

COUNTERCYCLICAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

53

This would be a misreading of the case. The board’s power was
derived from the fact that it had been elected by shareholders, and would
have to be re-elected by shareholders to maintain the defense. 173 Shareholder
voting remains largely sacrosanct. Even though Delaware courts permit
boards to frustrate hostile tender offers, boards are largely precluded from
interfering with shareholder voting.174 The corporation is not a selfperpetuating entity with goals that courts will endlessly defend even against
shareholder opposition.175
This difference in treatment between boards interfering with a
shareholder’s decision to sell her shares and boards interfering with a
shareholder’s vote also suggests that Delaware law is designed to facilitate
enlightened deliberation by shareholders. The difference might be
rationalized as pure formalism,176 or as the result of strategic judicial
behavior.177
But a more powerful explanation is that Delaware law allows boards
to structure the shareholders’ decision in the way that best engages their
moral and practical faculties.178 As Professors Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
have explained, a given shareholder’s decision is unlikely to make the
difference in whether a takeover goes through. This fact means that a
shareholder has little reason to resist a premium offer to buy her shares, as
The Airgas court specifically held that it was realistic for Air Products to
replace a majority of the Airgas board at the next annual meeting. 16 A.3d at 121.
174
See Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(board violated fiduciary duties when it adopted anti-takeover measures with the
purpose of interfering with shareholder vote).
175
Compare eBay, 16 A.3d at 35 (rejecting poison pill where stated purpose
was to require corporate policy even after controlling shareholders had died and
were unable to maintain it themselves).
176
The Delaware General Corporation Law grants a duly elected board the
power to manage the business, justifying deference on all matters apart from the
board’s election. 8 Del. C. § 141 (“The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate
of incorporation.”).
177
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Story of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.:
Keeping the Electoral Path to Takeovers Clear, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES
243, 288-89 (J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., 2009) (suggesting that appellate review of
Blasius was dodged at a time when the Delaware Supreme Court was inclined to
sweep away obstacles to takeover defenses).
178
See Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize
Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L., FIN., & ACCOUNTING 247, 256
(2017).
173
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she will not be morally responsible for any unsavory conduct that results and
cannot prevent the damage to her other interests. But it also means that a
shareholder has no reason to vote for a transaction that she would prefer not
to occur, either on moral grounds or out of concern for other practical
interests. By allowing boards to require that decisions be made through
voting instead of sales, Delaware law ensures that corporate control decisions
maximize the shareholders’ welfare as understood by the shareholders
themselves, and not simply the financial value of company shares.
Contextualizing the precedents would support a countercyclical
corporate governance scheme by eliminating confusion. It could also
provide useful support by changing norms. Any system of corporate
governance — including one based on pure shareholder wealth maximization
— will ultimately depend on directors and officers internalizing a correct
understanding of what values they are supposed to serve. 179 Mixed messages
from the legal system interfere with internalization of the proper norms.

3.

Preventing or Rolling Back Contrary Reforms

Countercyclical corporate governance would depend on authorities
refraining from introducing new legal obstacles to institutional investors using
their power to vote and engage with corporations.
But various commentators and government actors have sought to
prevent certain institutional investors from using their power at a given
corporation to advance any goal other than maximizing the value of their
investment in that corporation.180 In support of this effort, Trump
Administration Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia stressed his view that
“[p]rivate employer-sponsored retirement plans are not vehicles for
furthering social goals or policy objectives that are not in the financial interest
of the plan.”181 The Department of Labor published a final rule on
See Savitt & Kovvali, supra note 123; Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper
Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo
Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151
179

(2001).

See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Admin., U.S.
Department of Labor Proposes New Investment Duties Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF
180

LABOR
(June
23,
2020),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20200623;
Max
M.
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social
Conscience, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2020).
181
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 180.
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November 13, 2020 advancing these principles.182 These regulatory changes
were put on hold by the Biden Administration. In a March 2021 statement,
the Department of Labor stated that it intended to revisit the rules and that it
would not enforce the rules in the interim. 183
Even if they were reinstated, such rules may not prohibit support for
countercyclical corporate governance. Casting votes to hasten the end of a
recession would be in the pecuniary interest of underlying customers and
would secure an economic benefit for them.184 But introducing uncertainty
on the issue could diminish the willingness of institutional investors to pursue
the approach. Indeed, the Biden Administration suggested that in the few
months that they had been in force, the rules had “already had a chilling effect
on appropriate integration of ESG factors in investment decisions, including
in circumstances that the rules can be read to explicitly allow.” 185
If it did prove to be an obstacle, government regulators should be
willing to introduce appropriate exceptions for macroeconomic context.
Whether motivated by a general skepticism toward financial institutions
exercising power186 or a partisanship-inflected view on issues like climate
change and social stability,187 the proposed reforms are not deliberately
targeted at countercyclical corporate governance.

Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846 (Nov.
13, 2020) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 2509, 2550). A related rule addresses the use of
shareholder votes. See Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder
Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,658 (Dec. 16, 2020).
183
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Statement Regarding
Enforcement of Its Final Rules on ESG Investments And Proxy Voting By
Employee
Benefit
Plans
(Mar.
10,
2021),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/laws-andregulations/laws/erisa/statement-on-enforcement-of-final-rules-on-esg-investmentsand-proxy-voting.pdf.
184
But see Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at
72,850 (rejecting view that “fiduciaries should be permitted to consider the potential
for an investment to create jobs for workers who in turn would participate in the
plan”); id. at 72,867 (“the fact that an investment . . . arguably promotes positive
general market trends or industry growth” does not imply that it “is a prudent choice
for retirement investors”).
185
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 180.
186
See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance, supra note 111 at 2067.
187
Cf. Madison Condon, The Firm Administering the Coronavirus Rescue
182

Considers Climate Risks in Its Ordinary Investments; Republicans told them not
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4.

Facilitative Reforms

The law could do more to facilitate countercyclical efforts by private
actors. A supportive reform would encourage institutional investors to better
serve the real interests of underlying customers by focusing on issues that
impact sustainable growth.188
Expanded disclosure requirements would also help investors hold
managers accountable for failing to deliver stimulus. Disclosure on
workforce issues would be particularly useful in evaluating whether
companies have selected employment levels that are appropriate for a given
point in the business cycle. This would not require a substantial departure
from ordinary considerations, as there has already been investor agitation for
expanded disclosures on human capital issues. For example, when adopting
updates to Regulation S-K, the Securities and Exchange Commission
received extensive comments urging that a variety of employee issues were
important to investment decisions.189
V.

Government Implementations

The government could also directly install a countercyclical approach
to corporate decision-making. This Part provides a brief and non-exhaustive
sketch of potential strategies for reform, with the goal of identifying some
promising avenues for future analysis. Part V.A considers changes to the
legal regime governing extraordinary corporate events, such as mergers and
bankruptcies. Part V.B considers potential changes to ordinary corporate
governance, such as changes to fiduciary duties or the introduction of a
to

this time, SLATE (Apr. 20, 2020), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2020/04/republicans-block-blackrock-climate-risk-assesment.html.
188
For a recent example of thinking along these lines, see Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Stewardship 2021: The Centrality of Institutional Investor Regulation to Restoring
a Fair and Sustainable American Economy, COLUM. CTR. FOR L. & ECON.

STUDIES
WORKING
PAPER
NO.
633
(Oct.
23,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3719145
189
Allison Herren Lee, Regulation S-K and ESG Disclosures: An
Unsustainable Silence, U.S. SECS. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-regulation-s-k-2020-08-26.
The
SEC ultimately adopted a principles-based approach that Commissioner Lee found
inadequate. Id.; see also John C. Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG,
Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk, EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST. L.
WORKING PAPER NO. 541/2020 (Aug. 2020) (noting that diversified institutional
investors have sought additional ESG disclosures, and suggesting that their purpose
is to control systemic risks).
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codetermination scheme. Part V.C considers the potential for governments
to act in their capacity as shareholders. Part V.D considers tax and regulatory
reforms.
A.

Changing Regulation of Extraordinary Corporate Events

The law’s approach to mergers and acquisitions could be revised.
Delaware law might empower boards or other groups to resist takeovers if
they would cause harm to stakeholders. For example, a corporation might
resist a takeover if it would result in mass layoffs. At a minimum, Delaware
could expressly revive the approach of Unocal and reject the approach of
Revlon.190 As a stronger measure, Delaware might empower outside groups
to prevent takeovers, or permit boards to empower outside groups. 191
There are some good reasons to be skeptical of such measures,
unless outside groups are given formal powers or the board is given incentives
that align to stakeholders’ interests. Some states have adopted “constituency
statutes” intended to permit boards to consider stakeholders’ interests, but
because the statutes did not change incentives or stakeholders’ powers, it is
not clear that they had the desired effect. 192 Empowering certain
constituencies may also frustrate a countercyclical approach because
constituencies like creditors would not want firms to take the steps that would
most increase economic activity.193
An alternative would be to revise government and judicial review of
proposed transactions. Under current law, operational synergies are
generally seen as a positive feature of merger transactions. If a shareholder
of the acquired company demands an appraisal — that is, to be paid the value
of their shares as determined by a court — the value of the synergies will be
deducted from the appraisal result.194 Similarly, antitrust regulators are more

190

See supra Part IV.D.2.

In a thoughtful student note, Tianna Larson suggests that Delaware should
be more tolerant of dead hand poison puts during a zero lower bound recession.
Larson, supra note 2.
192
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 21 (concluding that constituency
statutes have not caused boards to strike deals that better serve stakeholder
interests); Savitt & Kovvali, supra note 123 (critiquing this analysis).
193
See supra Part II.C.2.
194
See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Finding the Right
Balance In Appraisal Litigation: Deal Price, Deal Process, and Synergies, 73 BUS.
LAW. 961, 993 (2018) (“deal price . . . must be adjusted to eliminate the portion of
that price attributable to synergistic merger gains”).
191
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likely to approve a transaction if it creates “efficiencies” by cutting costs. 195 If
these synergies are to be realized by slashing staff or spending, they may not
be helpful during a recession.196 As a result, eliminating the credits under
current law may be worthwhile in a recession. Indeed, an almost total
inversion of the normal approach — for example, granting workers an
“appraisal” right based on the value of their eliminated role in the company
— may be worth considering.197
Reforms might target other extraordinary corporate events. Professor
Zachary Liscow has proposed revising bankruptcy practice during periods of
high unemployment.198 Under his approach, bankruptcy judges would strive
to preserve jobs in reorganizations that occur during a recession, provided
that the jobs could be preserved at lower cost within the reorganization than
through ordinary fiscal policy.199 The regime would pick up firms outside the
reach of the index fund mechanism — index funds are unlikely to have a
meaningful stake in a bankruptcy reorganization. And it would help address
concerns about increased risk taking by firms that face potential insolvency, 200
by ensuring that a bankruptcy would not necessarily lead to mass layoffs.

195

See Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 7 at 585.

On the other hand, firms’ increased ability to charge higher prices — a clear
problem under antitrust law — could be helpful in the context of a recession,
because it would raise inflation expectations and encourage immediate spending.
See LISTOKIN, supra note 1 at 141, 165-66 (describing analysis by Gauti Eggertson
suggesting that collusion between firms facilitated by early New Deal reforms may
have been beneficial in the context of the Great Depression).
197
The value might be presumptively set at zero outside the context of a
recession. While this would fail to take into account the value of workers’ firmspecific investments, it would avoid imposing a tax on transactions that are efficient
in periods of macroeconomic success. Still, this approach would have serious
problems. Making it more difficult to fire workers could discourage hiring. See
Liscow, supra note 1 at 1471. Ordinary appraisal litigation is often inefficient and
had become an arbitrage opportunity for hedge funds. Workers are also diverse,
making it difficult to consolidate their claims or dispose of them efficiently. See
Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 7 at 543. On balance, the difficulties may
outweigh any putative benefits.
198
See Liscow, supra note 1 at 1461.
196

199
200

Id.
See supra Part II.C.2.
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Changing Ordinary Corporate Governance

The federal government could also revise the fiduciary duties of
directors and officers at substantial firms201 or at firms receiving bailout
funds.202 Instead of having a duty to maximize the value of a corporation for
the benefit of its shareholders, corporate officers and directors would have a
duty to serve other groups. Uniform duty rules have drawbacks. 203 But they
would help limit the need for customized engagement by shareholders,
would facilitate a coordinated response by orienting all corporate leaders in
the same direction, and would put real teeth behind the concept.
If the reform were pursued, action at the federal level seems
appropriate. Delaware is an attractive site for normal corporate law decisionmaking in part because it is not a major economic power. As a result, it is
not normally tempted to manipulate the content of corporate law to advance
an industrial policy in the way that larger states might be. 204 But that advantage
in normal times could be an impediment to a countercyclical corporate
governance scheme, which would seek to align corporate law with economic
policy.
At the same time, federalizing corporate law would be a major change
that would carry substantial costs. For the scheme to work, decisions would
also have to be made rapidly; relying on Congress would render the approach
as slow as ordinary fiscal policy tools. This problem might be addressed by
delegating authority to an expert agency like the Federal Reserve, or an expert
bench of commercial judges.
The federal government could also pursue a more fundamental
reform, such as implementing a codetermination scheme in which workers
are entitled to elect representatives to the boards of important companies.

Provisions of Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposed Accountable
Capitalism Act, which are modeled on Delaware’s benefit corporation statute,
would revise fiduciary duty law to call for consideration of stakeholders.
202
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a Fair and Sustainable Capitalism,
ROOSEVELT
INST.
(Aug.
2020),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/RI_TowardFairandSustainableCapitalism_WorkingPap
er_202008.pdf at 5, 13.
203
E.g. Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1309 (2008).
204
See, e.g., Strine, The Delaware Way, supra note 145 at 679-80 (“for us, a
small state, it is vital that we remain the leader in corporation law”); R OMANO, supra
note 16 at 38.
201
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Proposals have been floated in Congress,205 and ideas have been debated in
the academic literature.206 Such a scheme would almost certainly have to be
mandatory and federal to prevent evasion.207
A full evaluation of an American codetermination scheme would be
beyond the scope of this Article.208 But codetermination schemes might help
limit the duration of a macroeconomic crisis by helping firms to renegotiate
relationships with employees instead of engaging in layoffs.209 By empowering

E.g., S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (Accountable Capitalism Act), S. 2605,
115th Cong. (2018) (Reward Work Act).
206
See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A
Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SECURITIES REG.
155 (1982).
205

207

See id.

For a broader analysis, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Aneil Kovvali & Oluwatomi
Williams, Lifting Labor’s Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice
And Power Within American Corporate Governance, 106 MINN. L. REV. --(forthcoming 2022).
209
Firms subject to codetermination schemes were slower to fire employees
during the Great Recession. See, e.g., Deutschland AG rethinks workers’ role in
management,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Feb.
1,
2020),
https://www.economist.com/business/2020/02/01/deutschland-ag-rethinksworkers-role-in-management (discussing study suggesting that “companies with
labour representatives on supervisory boards . . . sacked fewer workers and
reinvested more. Their cumulative total returns between 2006 and 2011 were also
28 percentage points higher”); Marc Steffen Rapp & Michael Wolff, Strong
Codetermination – Stable Companies, HANS-BOCKLER FOUNDATION (2019)
(reporting findings that German companies with codetermination laid off fewer
employees, maintained research and development, raised more outside capital, and
engaged in fewer transactions to deliver returns to equity holders); Aleksandra
Gregoric & Marc Steffen Rapp, Board-Level Employee Representation (BLER)
and Firms’ Responses to Crisis, 58 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 376 (2019)
(Scandinavian firms with board level employee representation conducted fewer
layoffs during Great Recession, in part because of their success in negotiating labor
cost reductions); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era:
Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation ,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 939 (1993) (“workers may be more willing to accept
lower working conditions in times of financial difficulty because they will have more
confidence that they will gain from these sacrifices in the long-run”).
Codetermination may also make it easier to renegotiate wages, reducing the
stickiness of wages and making prolonged periods of elevated unemployment less
likely. Gregoric & Rapp, supra; O’Connor, supra at 939; Henry Hansmann, When
208

Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and
Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1765-66 (1990); Clyde W. Summers,
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workers within the corporate structure, it could also help prevent layoffs that
deepen a crisis, even if such layoffs would generate some short term financial
returns for undiversified shareholders.
However, codetermination would be a blunt instrument for
implementing a countercyclical approach. By institutionalizing a particular
allocation of power, codetermination would reshape corporate decisions
even outside of an economic crisis. The changed decisions might entail
underinvestment in other forms of capital, or an inefficient deployment of
labor across firms.210 A firm with a codetermination governance structure may
also provide inefficient stimulus. For example, if existing employees have a
seat at the table and potential employees do not, a company might choose to
pay existing employees more instead of hiring an additional unemployed
worker.211 But delivering funds to someone who is unemployed would be
likely to prompt more spending — a cash-strapped unemployed worker will
be more likely to spend a marginal dollar than an employee who has been
drawing a stable salary — and thus provide more stimulus.212 Codetermination
could also unhelpfully make firms more risk averse by giving partial control
to workers, who are unable to diversify their holdings to manage firm-specific
risk in the way that shareholders can.213 A broader codetermination scheme
that addressed these issues by reserving seats for interest groups other than
current workers could prove difficult to install and administer.
Where it is practiced, codetermination is just one of a number of
interrelated mechanisms, including some that can help mitigate these
tensions.214 For example, strong trade unions would have the means and
incentives to attend to the health of the overall labor market, instead of
Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials , 4
J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 164 (1982); O’Connor, supra at 939.
See infra Part VI.B.
Cf. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production
Functions: An Application to Labor Managed Firms and Co-determination , 52 J.
210
211

BUS. 469 (1979) (observing that if firms maximize average earnings per worker,
they may contract employment in response to exogenous shocks).
212
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
213
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 211 (describing this as one of a class of
problems relating to the non-marketability of the workers’ control rights); Jens
Dammann & Horst Eidenmüller, Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S.
Corporations, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 870, 932-34 (2020). Risk aversion may be
unhelpful in a crisis. See supra Part II.C.2.
214
See Strine, Kovvali & Williams, supra note 208 (discussing
codetermination as one of several mechanisms including strong unions and sectoral
bargaining).
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focusing exclusively on the parochial interests of employees at a particular
firm. But codetermination in isolation could have different effects, which
would make it a problematic tool for a countercyclical approach.
C.

Government as Shareholder

Government entities might build up equity stakes and use their voting
power to support a countercyclical approach. This would represent more of
an evolution than a revolution: sovereign wealth funds are already used to
support the macroeconomic policies of various countries, 215 and government
entities in the United States are increasingly interested in using equity
investments to support public policy.216 Such an approach could also be used
in combination with revised strategies by the Federal Reserve. If the Federal
Reserve purchased equity stakes in open market operations, it could use the
accompanying control rights to implement a countercyclical approach.
This approach would raise a host of problems. At a mechanical level,
the government would have to manage and monitor a large portfolio of equity
securities. The government would also have to manage dangerous tensions
— it might be tempted to protect its portfolio companies by using its regulatory
muscle to lean on competitors or counterparties, or to respond to political
pressures by forcing portfolio companies to take value-destroying steps. 217
Some of these tensions might be reduced by enacting a clear statutory
regime, or by delegating authority over stewardship decisions to an insulated
and relatively apolitical agency. And many of the tensions are in play even
without governments taking or using equity stakes, as the government and
community can already pressure companies to fulfill an expected social
218

See Attracta Mooney, Coronavirus ends ‘golden’ era for sovereign wealth
funds, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 30, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/46a6bdf4215

c965-48ff-be58-820067b04e81 (noting that governments are tapping sovereign
wealth funds to support stimulus spending in the wake of the recession caused by
COVID-19).
216
See, e.g., Michael Garland, Jennifer Conovitz & Yumi Narita, NYC
Comptroller’s Boardroom Accountability 3.0 Results, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (June 24, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/24/nyccomptrollers-boardroom-accountability-3-0-results/ (describing efforts by the New
York City Comptroller and New York City Retirement Systems to use shareholder
engagement to advance various policies on social judgment and climate change).
217
For an analysis of some of these issues, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 40.
218
See id. at 1344-45 (noting that Congress had not expected the Treasury to
acquire equity securities in past crisis, and so had not provided any guidance on
how an equity stake was to be managed).
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role.219 But they are substantial issues, and may prompt serious opposition to
a new scheme of government ownership of equity.
D.

Taxes and Regulations

Governments might adopt tax or regulatory schemes that encourage
corporations to take countercyclical actions. While these measures would
not represent internal reforms to corporate governance in the sense of
changing corporate objectives or decision-making, they might induce similar
behavior.
One strategy might be to target retained earnings during recessions,
with the goal of inducing corporations to spend or invest funds instead of
hoarding them in a crisis. For example, an undistributed profits tax designed
to prevent corporations from holding on to excess capital was proposed
during the New Deal.220 Such a measure could force corporations to spend,
invest, or return capital to investors. But it could also cause corporations to
decrease capital reserves in periods of strong economic performance, making
them more vulnerable to shocks.221 And as discussed above, distributing value
to shareholders may not be useful during a macroeconomic crisis.
Another strategy would be to target the means by which corporations
distribute value to shareholders during recessions. At an extreme, the
government could ban stock buybacks during recessions. 222 Alternatively, the
Securities and Exchange Commission could withdraw the current safe harbor
for share repurchases during recessions.223 The government might create
See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Quasi Governments and Inchoate Law:
Berle’s Vision of Limits on Corporate Power, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 619
219

(2019) (excavating the concept of “inchoate law” from Adolf Berle’s scholarship).
220
See LISTOKIN, supra note 1 at 165; Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers,
Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167
(2002).
221
The government might respond by layering on capital reserve
requirements akin to those applied to financial institutions. See Masur & Posner,
Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, supra note 1 at 860, 878-79 (describing
macroprudential regulations which set capital requirements for banks that increase
during booms and decrease during recessions). But non-financial firms may not
be well positioned to cope with such regulations.
222
For example, Senator Tammy Baldwin’s Reward Work Act would
prohibit companies from purchasing shares on national securities exchanges. S.
2605, 115th Cong. (2018).
223
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18. A modification to the rule during recessions
may be appropriate on other grounds. During a period of financial volatility and
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similar incentives by removing tax code preferences for capital gains or
instituting transactions taxes that would help limit shareholder returns from
corporate financial activities that provide a quick boost to share prices without
creating long term value.224
A final strategy would be for the government to use regulations to
build up centers of “countervailing power” that could deal with corporations
at arm’s length.225 Empowering external forces like organized labor would
shape the environment in which corporations operate, driving them toward
outcomes that are similar to those that would be achieved by internal
corporate governance reforms like codetermination.226 An exploration of
such external reforms would be beyond the scope of this Article, but such
reforms are a viable path for changing corporate behavior.
VI.

Limitations and Objections

While countercyclical corporate governance has potential, it is not a
perfect tool. This Part considers some limitations and objections to the
approach.
A.

Indeterminacy and Uncertainty

Commentators frequently object to stakeholder governance by urging
that it is indeterminate and fails to provide meaningful guidance to corporate
actors on how they should make decisions.227 But the macroeconomic
perspective provides a framework for evaluating which stakeholder
constituencies firms should focus on, and how they should do so.
For example, increasing total payouts to workers would generally be
helpful, but hiring more workers would be preferable to paying higher wages
dislocation, buybacks could pose particular dangers, and be more likely to have
manipulative effects. See supra notes 45 to 46 and accompanying text.
224
See Strine, Stewardship 2021, supra note 188 at 30.
225
See Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance and Countervailing Power,
74 BUS. LAW. 1 (2018) (excavating John Kenneth Galbraith’s concept of
countervailing power); cf. Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing
Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality , 130
YALE L.J. 546 (2021) (suggesting legal reforms to facilitate organizing by the poor
and working class).
226
Cf. LISTOKIN, supra note 1 at 165 (noting that the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 was a New Deal measure that “aimed to empower unions so
that workers’ wages would increase. This would raise inflation expectations,
stimulating spending.”).
227
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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to existing employees.228 Attention to customers could also be helpful if it
temporarily decreases prices, effectively increasing the money supply and
lowering real interest rates by prompting expectations that prices will snap
back upward in the future. Concern for the environment could be helpful if
it results in investments in better equipment and infrastructure, but unhelpful
(at least from a recession management perspective) if it drives down the level
of investment or activity.229
Still, although a macroeconomic approach does offer a criterion for
decision-making, critics might argue that macroeconomic thinking is not
sufficiently developed to evaluate these considerations.
There are at least three responses. First, it is not clear which way any
uncertainty cuts. There are meaningful debates among macroeconomists on
important issues, such as the reason for prolonged recessions after financial
crises.230 But if competing explanations all point to the need for measures to
increase demand, the dispute is not relevant. 231 Uncertainty can also affect
the costs of the approach. The key efficiency concern with the approach is
that corporations may over-hire or over-invest at a point in the business cycle
where costs outweigh benefits. If firms over-invest or over-hire when the
economy has no spare capacity, they will do little to boost the economy and
will instead distort behavior. But there is sometimes slack in the economy
that is not readily apparent to economists.232
Second, the critique demands too much. Microeconomic theory
only gives limited guidance to corporate actors about how to proceed. An
academic standing at a blackboard can hardly derive the optimal business
strategy from microeconomic principles. Instead, shareholder primacy
228
229

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See LISTOKIN, supra note 1 at 129-38 (discussing government positions on

the Keystone pipeline).
230
Id. at 158-59 (discussing and contrasting “liquidity trap,” “secular
stagnation,” and “debt supercycle” theories).
231
See. id. Other disputes may be more meaningful to the law and
macroeconomics agenda. For example, some macroeconomists have suggested
that slow economic growth has been caused by a lack of technological innovation,
while others stress a lack of aggregate demand. See Masur & Posner, Should
Regulation Be Countercyclical?, supra note 1 at 892 (discussing dispute between
Robert Gordon and Larry Summers). A corporate governance regime that is less
eager to please shareholders and more willing to divert value to workers would still
help alleviate suffering if growth and innovation slow down. And if slow growth is
inevitable, the cost of the change could actually go down.
232
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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theorists simply supply a criterion that corporate directors and officers are
expected to apply. Corporate law reflects this reality. If it were possible to
derive the optimal course of action from pure theory, there would be little
reason to shield corporate decisions from judicial scrutiny using the business
judgment rule. In the same way, macroeconomics suggests a criterion that
corporate actors can use in making decisions, and offers relevant insights. To
expect it to provide crystalline instructions in all circumstances would be to
hold it to a higher standard than other approaches.
Third, the critique demands too much in another way. Government
actors have little to guide them except macroeconomic theory when they act
to mitigate recessions. This is not to say that governments know in advance
how a policy will turn out: the New Deal was characterized by “bold,
persistent experimentation.”233 But it is not clear why federal policymakers
studying macroeconomic theory would do a better job of dealing with
uncertainty than business leaders.
B.

Inefficient Investment

A final category of concerns relates to the possibility that firms will
invest in inefficient projects or underinvest in capital. But these potential
problems must be measured against an appropriate baseline. In a
macroeconomic crisis, markets already fail to set prices that will drive efficient
behavior and maximize social wealth. In such circumstances, changing the
way that a firm responds to prices would cause behavior that is more efficient.
Capital markets participants could also change their behavior in response to
countercyclical corporate governance, but such effects are unlikely.

1.

Firm Investments

A firm implementing countercyclical corporate governance would
not seek to maximize shareholder profits in all circumstances. To the extent
that maximizing shareholder profits aligns with maximizing economic
efficiency, as it arguably would outside of a macroeconomic crisis, this results
in inefficient behavior.
For example, a firm that sees wage payments less as a pure cost would
increase not only its level of production, but also its relative use of labor as

233

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at Oglethorpe Univ. (May 22, 1932).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4043883

COUNTERCYCLICAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

67

opposed to other inputs.234 But this type of distortion could be limited by
some of the mechanisms discussed here, which allow for flexible engagement
instead of setting strict priorities. A firm that considered all stakeholder
interests would value its suppliers and equipment manufacturers, not just its
workers. Depending on the approach taken, firms could also use periods of
macroeconomic success to rationalize their operations and reverse
temporary distortions.
Firms might also pursue less valuable projects and investments. This
is partly by design, and is a feature of traditional macroeconomic tools as well:
the goal behind using monetary policy to reduce interest rates is to induce
private actors to make investments that they would not make in a more robust
macroeconomic environment.
But it is a potential reason to prefer government fiscal action to
countercyclical corporate governance (or to a purely monetary response).
There are many investments that could set up the economy for long term
success but that are outside the reach of private firms, such as investments in
infrastructure, education, or fundamental research. Investments in such
projects would improve the overall productive capacity of the economy even
in good periods. However, such projects may not be the most effective way
to deliver a macroeconomic stimulus, given that they are unlikely to be
“shovel-ready” and allow spending to be delivered rapidly. By contrast, firms
can spend immediately simply by retaining workers whose productivity is less
than the prevailing wage.
Any distortion would also be limited by the nature of the firms
involved. The size of the stimulus delivered by a particular firm would
necessarily be proportionate to the resources available to that firm. As a
result, the stimulus would be delivered in a way that is somewhat proportional
to business success. Employment and investment would increase at firms
positioned to deliver things that the market will want. This in itself may be
less than optimal — smart government spending during a crisis could improve
upon ordinary market preferences, such as by leading a shift toward clean
energy — but it does entail less distortion away from the outcomes a properlyfunctioning market would generate.

As shown in equation (8) in Appendix B, the capital intensity of labor ( )
is affected by the firm’s focus on shareholder as opposed to worker interests ( s):
234

=

.
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The approach could also distort competition. If firms produce at
levels that cannot be justified by a pure profit maximization objective, they
may distort goods markets in a way that stifles competition: wealthy
companies will produce “too much” and depress the price of goods below
levels that would permit other firms to turn a profit. 235 The problem relates
to a more general concern that non-profit maximizing behavior by companies
would unsettle the usual assumptions that drive antitrust theory and
practice.236 But the effects would be limited if firms only take a countercyclical
approach during recessions, when there would be little hope of new entrants
emerging in any event.
A more fundamental objection could draw on the debate over
whether efficient legal rules should be altered to achieve outside goals such
as fairness.237 But the core purpose of corporate governance arrangements is
to generate wealth for society; that goal is not an outside distraction. 238 There
Cf. Shaoul Sussman, Prime Predator: Amazon and the Rationale of Below
Average Variable Cost Pricing Strategies Among Negative Cash-Flow Firms, 7 J.
235

ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
203
(2019),
https://academic.oup.com/antitrust/article/7/2/203/5321201
(suggesting
competition may be stifled by firms that engage in predatory pricing in anticipation
of growing large enough to reap scale benefits).
236
Cf. Damian G. Didden & Christina C. Ma, ESG Factors and Antitrust,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/27/esg-factors-and-antitrust/
(“Fundamentally, antitrust analysis is underpinned by the economic assumption
that corporations are motivated by profit maximization. . . . An era in which
corporations measure performance by factors other than profit could change this
fundamental assumption with potentially interesting implications.”).
237
See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute
Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 447 (2003); Liscow, supra note 1 at 1466-67
(urging that if a modified legal rule can achieve a desired effect with less than onethird distortion, it is likely to be more efficient than a tax-and-spend policy directed
at the same goal).
238
See, e.g., Ann M. Lipton, Doyle, Watson, and the Purpose of the
Corporation,
BUS.
L.
PROF.
BLOG
(Sep.
17,
2020),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2020/09/doyle-watson-and-thepurpose-of-the-corporation.html (“. . . I don’t think there’s any dispute that
corporations exist to serve the community as a whole. We charter corporations,
we create rules for their operation, we develop infrastructure to facilitate investing,
all because we believe that on balance, corporations are (or can be) a net good. . . .
Corporate purpose debates are not about those principles – on which, I suspect,
everyone agrees.”); REINIER KRAAKMAN, ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW 22-23 (3d ed. 2017) (“As a normative matter, the overall objective of
corporate law—as of any branch of law—is presumably to serve the interests of
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is a happy equilibrium in which workplaces hum with activity, and workers
are employed and collect wages that they can confidently spend on the
products created in those workplaces; and there is a sad equilibrium in which
workplaces fall quiet, and workers lose incomes and restrict their spending
out of fear. If corporate governance locks in the sad equilibrium, it fails in
its core purpose and is not efficient in any real sense. If distributing some
control or value to workers or other constituencies would correct the
problem, it would be consistent with the ordinary purpose of corporate law.

2.

Capital Markets

Countercyclical corporate governance could also distort financial
markets. But the strength of this concern would depend on the intervention
selected. For example, an implementation mediated by index funds 239 should
not lead to outcomes that are so adverse to shareholders that they seriously
distort financing decisions. An index fund presumably will not pressure
companies into behavior that is so extreme that investors pull back
dramatically from equity markets.
A countercyclical approach also would not be a radical departure
from the expectations set by existing law. Business leaders already enjoy
ample discretion to make decisions that benefit stakeholders. Although the
decisions are frequently defended as being for the long term benefit of
shareholders, they are functionally insulated from meaningful judicial review
under the business judgment rule.240 No current shareholder could
reasonably expect that the law would force business leaders to put
shareholder interests ahead of all others, so they are unlikely to take radical
action in response to a shift in corporate orientation.
Any impact would also be muted by the broader macroeconomic
context during a crisis. Even if some shareholders were frightened by a
temporary turn toward stakeholders in a crisis, they would have relatively few
higher yielding alternatives. And if shareholders are unlikely to pull away,

society as a whole. More particularly, the appropriate goal of corporate law is to
advance the aggregate welfare of all who are affected by a firm’s activities, including
the firm’s shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers, as well as third
parties such as local communities and beneficiaries of the natural environment.
This is what economists would characterize as the pursuit of overall social
welfare.”).
239
See supra Part IV.
240
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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the prospect of a shareholder response is unlikely to distort the behavior or
performance of firms.
Conclusion
Modifying corporate governance arrangements is a problematic tool
for managing the business cycle. But all macroeconomic tools have problems
— some of which could be exacerbated by corporate governance
arrangements that were crafted without adequate attention to
macroeconomic considerations. Macroeconomic arguments could play an
important role in breaking the long stalemate in debates over corporate
governance arrangements, and corporate governance debates are a fertile
source of new options for those who have an interest in improving
macroeconomic outcomes.
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Appendix A: Illustrative Statistics on Selected Firms
Company
Name

Cash &
Securities
(billions)

Annual
Earnings
(billions)

Compensation
of Median
Employee

P/E
Ratio241

Microsoft242

$137.6

$44.3

$172,512

35.42

Apple243

$192.8

$55.3

$57,596

37.71

Amazon244

$55.0

$11.5

$36,640

97.63

Alphabet245

$117.2

$34.3

$258,708

33.88

Facebook246

$60.3

$18.5

$247,883

33.08

P/E Ratios obtained from Nasdaq.com “2020 Actual” of “Price/Earnings
Ratio” for MSFT, “2020 Estimates” for AAPL, “2020 Estimates” for AMZN,
“2020 Estimates” for GOOGL, “2020 Estimates” for FB, and “2020 Estimates” for
JNJ. P/E Ratios obtained from Yahoo Finance of “Forward P/E” for BRK-B.
242
Cash & Securities figure is March 31, 2020 “Total cash, cash equivalents,
and short term investments” value from Microsoft 10-Q. Annual Earnings figure
is “Net Income” for year ended June 30, 2020 from Microsoft 10-K.
Compensation of Median Employee was reported on page 48 of Microsoft’s 2019
proxy statement.
243
Cash & Securities figure is March 28, 2020 “Cash and cash equivalents”
plus “Marketable securities,” both current and non-current, from Apple 10-Q.
Annual Earnings figure is “Net Income” for year ended September 28, 2019 from
Apple 10-K. Compensation of Median Employee was reported on page 52 of
Apple’s 2020 proxy statement.
244
Cash & Securities figure is March 31, 2020 “Cash and cash equivalents”
plus “Marketable securities” from Amazon 10-Q. Annual Earnings figure is “Net
income” for year ended December 31, 2019 from Amazon 10-K. Compensation
of Median Employee figure based on “median annual total compensation for all
U.S. full-time Amazon employees” reported on page 65 of Amazon’s 2020 proxy
statement.
245
Cash & Securities figure is March 31, 2020 “Total cash, cash equivalents,
and marketable securities” value from Alphabet 10-Q. Annual Earnings figure is
“Net income” for year ended December 31, 2019 from Alphabet 10-K.
Compensation of Median Employee was reported on page 49 of Alphabet 2020
proxy statement.
246
Cash & Securities figure is March 31, 2020 “Cash and cash equivalents”
plus “Marketable securities” from Facebook 10-Q. Annual Earnings figure is “Net
income” for year ended December 31, 2019 from Facebook 10-K. Compensation
of Median Employee was reported on page 42 of Facebook’s 2020 proxy statement.
241
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Company
Name

Cash &
Securities
(billions)

Annual
Earnings
(billions)

Compensation
of Median
Employee

P/E
Ratio241

Berkshire
Hathaway247

$133.3

$81.8

$65,740

12.92

Johnson &
Johnson248

$18.0

$15.1

$76,000

18.83

Cash & Securities figure is March 31, 2020 “Cash and cash equivalents”
plus “Short-term investments in U.S. Treasury Bills” from Berkshire Hathaway 10Q. Annual Earnings figure is “Net earnings” for year ended December 31, 2019
from Berkshire Hathaway 10-K. Compensation of Median Employee was reported
on page 10 of Berkshire Hathaway’s 2020 proxy statement.
248
Cash & Securities figure is March 29, 2020 “Cash and cash equivalents”
plus “Marketable securities” from Johnson & Johnson 10-Q. Annual Earnings
figure is “Net earnings” for 2019 from Johnson & Johnson 10-K. Compensation
of Median Employee was reported on page 96 of Johnson & Johnson 2020 proxy
statement.
247
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Appendix B: Effect of Stakeholder Focus on Firm Production Decisions
In a typical model of the firm’s production decision, the firm is
modeled as setting a level of capital K and labor L that maximizes
shareholder profits π, given a revenue function R, a cost of renting capital r,
and wages w.249 Under this model, the firm seeks to set K and L to maximize:
π(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝑅(𝐾, 𝐿) − 𝑟𝐾 − 𝑤𝐿
Suppose instead that the firm seeks to balance shareholder and
worker interests by maximizing a linear function of profits received by
shareholders, weighted by a codetermination factor 𝑐 , and wages received
by workers, weighted by a codetermination factor 𝑐 . Under this model, the
firm seeks to set K and L to maximize:
𝑐 π(𝐾, 𝐿) + 𝑐 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑐 (𝑅(𝐾, 𝐿) − 𝑟𝐾 − 𝑤𝐿) + 𝑐 𝑤𝐿
After collecting terms and normalizing, the firm’s task can be
described as seeking to maximize an objective function f (K, L):
𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝑅(𝐾, 𝐿) − 𝑟𝐾 − 𝑠𝑤𝐿

(1)

Here, s ϵ (0, 1] is a variable representing the firm’s degree of focus
on shareholders as opposed to workers.250 The variable s is a fraction greater
than zero and less than or equal to 1 which captures the firm’s degree of focus
on shareholders as opposed to workers. If s = 1, the firm is fully focused on
shareholders, and the objective function collapses to a computation of
shareholder profits. Setting s to 1 thus models firm behavior in a traditional
shareholder-focused regime. As s declines, the firm is more focused on
workers, and the firm sees payments to workers less like a pure cost. This
permits modeling of firm behavior if an internal approach is used to change
the firm’s decision-making.

See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC
PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 346 (8th ed. 2002). For a generalized version
accommodating an infinite number of inputs, see ANDREU MAS-COLELL,
MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 137
(1995).
250
𝑠=
249
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As the form of the objective function suggests, changes to the wage
level w and changes to the firm’s level of regard for shareholders as opposed
to workers s can each be used to induce the firm to take particular production
decisions.251 If a macroeconomic crisis has brought prices and wages out of
alignment and is causing the firm to make suboptimal production decisions,
changing the firm’s orientation can improve the firm’s decisions.
Differentiating with respect to K and L to find the maximum gives
marginal products of capital and labor of:
𝑅 =𝑟

(2)

𝑅 = 𝑠𝑤

(3)

The intuition is that the firm will continue to rent out capital until the
marginal return from capital is equal to the rent. The firm will continue to
hire new labor until the marginal return from labor is equal to a fraction of
the prevailing wage level, with the fraction given by s, which captures the
firm’s degree of concern for shareholders as opposed to workers.
The ratio of the marginal product of capital to the marginal product
of labor at the optimal level of capital and labor is thus dependent on s:
=

(4)

Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and a competitive
market for the firm’s goods:252

Note that the model may not capture important aspects of
codetermination. Although codetermination gives workers a voice on the
corporate board, it does not appear to be addressed to monetary wages, in theory
or in practice. See Simon Jager, Benjamin Schroefer & Jorg Heining, Labor in the
Boardroom, NBER Working Paper No. 26519 (Aug. 25, 2020) at 33 (“[O]wner
representatives always retain the majority of board seats in the German
codetermination system (and in other countries with codetermined boards). Even
theories that do grant minority factions some real authority . . . would do so only in
matters unimportant to capital – a domain that plausibly excludes wage setting.”).
German codetermination coexists with other mechanisms that address wage levels,
such as sectoral bargaining by trade unions.
252
This aligns with a Cobb-Douglas production function combined with a
competitive environment for the firm’s goods. The assumption of a competitive
market for the firm’s product ensures that the firm’s production decision will have
no impact on prices. If the firm can influence prices, the analysis becomes more
251
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(5)

𝑅(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝐴𝐾 𝐿
The maximization conditions then become:
𝑅 = 𝐴𝛼𝐾

𝐿

𝑅 = 𝐴𝐾 𝛽𝐿

=𝑟

(6)

= 𝑠𝑤

(7)

Dividing (7) by (6) and rearranging terms permits computation of the
capital intensity of labor:
(8)

=

As would be expected, the firm will use more labor relative to capital
the more it values the payments to workers. As s goes down, reflecting more
of a worker orientation, the ratio declines.
For a concrete example, set α = β = 0.25, and A = 100, so that the
firm’s revenue function is:
.

𝑅(𝐾, 𝐿) = 100𝐾

𝐿

.

.

(9)

This gives maximization conditions and capital intensity of:
.

𝑅 = 25𝐾
𝑅 = 25𝐾

.

𝐿
𝐿

.

=𝑟

(10)

.

= 𝑠𝑤

(11)

=

(12)

Solving (12) for K and plugging into (11) gives:

complex. If economic actors expect price levels to increase in the future, they will
be more likely to spend and invest now. Expected inflation is thus a useful tool for
managing a macroeconomic crisis, and deflationary pressure is a problem. If the
firm “overproduces” in a non-competitive market, it could create deflationary
pressure. This would support a “switching” approach, in which firms move back
to a pure shareholder focus during periods of good economic performance. See
Part IV.B.2. In that scenario, consumers in a recession would reasonably expect
production to decrease and prices to increase when the recession was over, leading
them to spend now instead of later.
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.

25

.

𝐿

(13)

= 𝑠𝑤

Rearranging terms gives L as a function of s, w, and r:
𝐿=
and r:

(

) .

(14)

.

Plugging into (12) and rearranging terms gives K as a function of s, w,

𝐾=

(

) .

(15)

.

This permits calculation of shareholder profits and total wages as a
function of s, w, r:
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = (

) .

𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 =

.

−

.

(

) .

(

) .

−

.

(

(16)

) .

(17)

Using these formulae for various combinations of s, w, and r gives:
A

s=1
w=1
r=1

B

s=1
𝟏

C

s=

𝟏
𝟑

w=𝟑

w=1

r=1

r=1

K

625.0

1082.5

1082.5

L

625.0

3247.6

3247.6

R

2500.0

4330.1

4330.1

Shareholder
Profits

1250.0

2165.1

0.0

Total Wages

625.0

1082.5

3247.6
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These figures illustrate the points in the main text. First, the external
mechanism of wage reductions (moving from A to B) just induces the same
corporate decision as the internal mechanism of changing the firm’s
orientation (moving from A to C).
Second, reorienting the firm can be a particularly efficient way to
inject funds into the economy during a crisis. Shifting the firm’s governance
orientation to move the firm from scenario A to scenario C causes a 1250.0
decline in shareholder profits, but places an additional 2622.6 (= 3247.6 –
625.0) into worker hands.
Third, although reorienting the firm and lowering wage levels can
both be used to induce the same production decision, the mechanisms are
not identical in their effects. Scenario B and scenario C entail the same
production decision, but differ in their allocation of value as between
shareholders’ profits and workers’ wages. As discussed in the text, preserving
worker wages would likely do more to stimulate the economy than preserving
shareholder profits.
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